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Article

Erie’s Suppressed Premise
Michael Steven Green†
INTRODUCTION
Some originalists believe that interpreting the Constitution
with fidelity means following the Framers’ specific intent—that
is, deciding constitutional questions as the Framers themselves
would have if asked.1 For example, the death penalty cannot be
judged to be cruel and unusual—and so contrary to the Eighth
Amendment—unless the Framers would have said that the
death penalty is cruel and unusual.
But what if the Framers did not want judges to follow their
specific intent?2 What if they wanted their intent to be followed
only in the general sense that a judge interpreting the Eighth
Amendment should do her best to identify what actually is
cruel and unusual, whatever the Framers might have thought

† Robert E. & Elizabeth S. Scott Research Professor, College of William
& Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. I would like to thank Larry Alexander, Lea Brilmayer, Neal Devins, Scott Dodson, Larry Kramer, Kim Roosevelt,
Steven D. Smith, and Bill Van Alstyne for helpful comments on various versions of this Article. Kevin Crennan provided valuable research assistance.
Copyright © 2011 by Michael Steven Green.
1. E.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 402–10 (2d ed. 1997) (advocating the
interpretation of the Constitution on the basis of the Framers’ original intention ); Edwin Meese III, Attorney Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION 1 (Paul G. Cassel ed., 1986). I ignore here further refinements
of the originalist approach. For a short history of the evolution of originalism,
see Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 923, 927–38 (2009).
2. E.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 948 (1985) (denying “intentionalism was the original presupposition of American constitutional discourse”); Richard A. Posner,
In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control, NEW REPUBLIC,
Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 33.
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about the matter?3 Would that mean that specific-intent originalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation is bankrupt?
Not necessarily. There might be an argument for following
the Framers’ specific intent even if they did not want their specific intent to be followed.4 Such an approach might be justified,
for example, because it cabins the power of judicial review. If
judges are allowed to exercise their own judgment about what
types of punishment are cruel and unusual, they will have too
much power to overturn the actions of the political branches of
government. But if such an argument works,5 originalism
would, in a sense, be turned on its head. Instead of being a doctrine devoted to following the Framers’ intent, it would fundamentally refuse to respect their intent.
This Article is about a similar phenomenon in connection
with the Erie doctrine.6 In the first year of law school, our civil
procedure professors told us that Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins7 overruled Swift v. Tyson.8 Under Swift, the common law
was conceived of as a “brooding omnipresence”9 about which
federal and state courts could come to differing judgments. Erie
changed all that. A federal court could not come to its own conclusions about the common law in Pennsylvania.10 It had to defer to the decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.11
Our civil procedure professors did not tell us, however,
what a federal court should do if the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court did not want deference. What if it thought the common
law in Pennsylvania was a matter about which federal courts
could come to their own judgment? Why would the respect for
state courts demanded by Erie not compel federal courts, paradoxically, to adopt Swift concerning Pennsylvania common law?

3. On the distinction between specific and general intent in constitutional interpretation, see David O. Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and
Judicial Review, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105, 121–24 (1988).
4. E.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 181 (1999)
(“Originalism neither depends on the interpretive intent of the founders nor
employs that intent.”).
5. I take no stand on whether it does.
6. I thank Neal Devins for recognizing the analogy with originalism.
7. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
8. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
9. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
10. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 79–80.
11. See id. at 80 (following Falchetti v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 307 Pa. 203
(1932)).
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This is not a purely theoretical worry. At the time that
Swift was decided, most state courts had their own Swiftian
conception of the common law.12 If they entertained a commonlaw action arising in a sister state, they came to their own conclusions about what the common law in the sister state was,
without deferring to the sister state’s courts.13 This suggests
that they conceived of their own common law as something
about which sister-state and federal courts could come to an independent judgment. Furthermore, even when Erie was decided in 1938, some states remained committed to this Swiftian
view of the common law. Indeed, at least one state—Georgia—
appears to still understand the common law in Swiftian
terms.14
By claiming that state decisions bind a federal court, without considering state court views on the matter, Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Erie appears to violate his own command to
respect the authority of state courts concerning state law. If we
are to save Brandeis’s argument, Erie must be turned on its
head. A premise must be added that limits state courts’ power
to determine the binding effect of their decisions. My goal is to
make this suppressed premise in Brandeis’s argument explicit
and to explore its effects.
I begin by describing in greater detail the gap in Brandeis’s
argument.15 In particular, I will show that it cannot be filled by
Erie’s positivist mandate that all law—including the common
law—“does not exist without some definite authority behind
it.”16 Positivism is compatible with the Swiftian notion that a
state’s common-law standards are a factual question about
which the courts of other sovereigns, including federal courts,
may come to their own judgment.17
In the light of positivism’s failure to explain Brandeis’s
conclusion in Erie, I offer what I believe is the suppressed
premise in his argument—namely, a constitutionally mandated
nondiscrimination principle.18 A state supreme court may not
free federal courts of the duty to follow its decisions concerning
12. See infra Part I.B.
13. Id.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 89–90.
15. See infra Part I.
16. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
17. See infra note 105.
18. See infra Part II.
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state law unless it is willing to free its own courts of the same
duty. It may not vary the binding effect of its decisions depending on whether the effect is in a domestic or a federal court.
Since the Georgia Supreme Court takes its common-law decisions to bind Georgia state courts, they must bind federal
courts as well.19 I also argue that there is an analogous horizontal nondiscrimination principle, derivable from the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, that prohibits state supreme courts
from varying the binding effect of their decisions depending on
whether the effect is in a domestic or a sister-state court.
I then explore the suppressed premise in Brandeis’s argument in connection with the predictive method—that is, the
view that a federal court interpreting unsettled state law must
predict how the state supreme court would decide.20 The Supreme Court has suggested that the predictive method follows
from the deference to state supreme courts demanded by Erie.21
But here, too, we encounter our puzzle. The Supreme Court has
imposed an interpretive method on federal courts without considering what the state supreme court thinks about the matter.
What if the state supreme court does not care whether federal
courts use the predictive method in deciding unsettled questions of its law?
Once again, this is not a purely theoretical problem. The
courts of some states—such as New York—do not use the predictive method when interpreting the unsettled law of sister
states.22 New York courts simply presume that unsettled sisterstate law is the same as New York law, without trying to predict how the sister-state supreme court would decide.23 This
suggests that the New York Court of Appeals does not think
that unsettled questions of New York law must be decided by
federal (or sister-state) courts according to the predictive method. If that is so, why has the Supreme Court claimed that the
predictive method is constitutionally mandated? How can it tell
the New York Court of Appeals how unsettled questions of New
York law must be decided? The solution to this puzzle, I argue,
is the vertical nondiscrimination principle latent in Erie. The
New York Court of Appeals may not free federal courts of their
duty to interpret unsettled New York law according to the pre19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See infra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.
See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 179–84 and accompanying text.
See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
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dictive method, except by changing (dramatically) the way such
law is interpreted in New York state courts.
I end by briefly describing the effect of the nondiscrimination principles in Erie and the Full Faith and Credit Clause on
horizontal (state-state) choice of law.24 A growing number of
scholars have recommended that choice-of-law principles be reformed in the light of Erie.25 If the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has decided that Pennsylvania law does not apply to certain interstate facts, federal and sister-state courts must take
its decision as binding. But here, too, our puzzle arises. What if
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court does not think its choice-oflaw decisions bind federal or sister-state courts?26 What if it
understands the territorial scope of Pennsylvania law in Swiftian terms, as a matter about which federal and sister-state
courts may come to their own judgment? And here, too, the
problem is not purely theoretical. Under every choice-of-law
approach currently in use, the choice-of-law decisions of a sister
state are ignored when determining whether sister-state law
applies.27 This suggests that every state supreme court thinks
that its own choice-of-law decisions can be ignored by sisterstate and federal courts.
Nondiscrimination explains how deference to a state supreme court’s choice-of-law decisions can be justified even when
such deference is contrary to its wishes. Since the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court takes its choice-of-law decisions to bind lower
Pennsylvania state courts, they must be binding throughout
the American legal system.
I. THE PUZZLE
A. SWIFT AND ERIE
In 1836, George Tysen purchased land in Maine from Nathaniel Norton and Jairus Keith.28 To secure payment for the
land, Norton and Keith drew up in Maine a bill of exchange of
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 211–15.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 204 –10.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 206–10.
28. Tyson’s name was actually Tysen. It was misspelled in the Supreme
Court’s opinion. Herbert Hovenkamp, Federalism Revised, 34 HASTINGS L.J.
201, 204 n.20 (1982) (reviewing TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE
SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981)). When referring to Mr.
Tysen himself, I’ll use his correct name. When referring to the Supreme Court
case, I’ll use the spelling that occurred in the Court’s opinion.
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$1,540.30, payable six months later to Norton or his endorsee.29
Tysen accepted the bill in New York.30 Norton then endorsed
the bill to John Swift in partial satisfaction of a debt that Norton and Keith owed to Swift in connection with a previous purchase of land.31
As it turned out, Tysen had been duped. Norton and Keith
did not own the land (which was worthless swamp anyway).32
When Swift sought to collect on the bill at maturity, Tysen refused to pay, on the grounds that Norton and Keith had fraudulently induced him to accept.33 Swift then sued Tysen to enforce
the bill in federal court in the Southern District of New York
under diversity jurisdiction.34
It was agreed that Swift took the bill without any knowledge of Norton and Keith’s fraud.35 Accordingly, if he was a
bona fide purchaser of the bill for valid consideration, he should
be entitled to enforce it against Tysen.36 The question was
whether Swift’s promise to discharge a preexisting debt to Norton and Keith was valid consideration.37 Tysen argued that, according to New York common law, it was not.38
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Story, held
that the matter was one of “general commercial law”39 that
could be decided by a federal court without deference to New
York decisions. Standing in the way of such a conclusion, however, was section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. This section,
also known as the Rules of Decision Act, stated that “[t]he laws
of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or
statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in

29. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 14 –15 (1842).
30. Id. at 14.
31. Id. at 14 –15. For a detailed account of the case, see FREYER, supra
note 28, at 4 –17.
32. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 15.
33. Id.
34. Swift was a citizen of Maine and Tysen was a citizen of New York.
35. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 14 –15.
36. Id. at 15.
37. See id. at 16 (“[I]t is further contended, that . . . a pre-existing debt
does not constitute . . . consideration.”).
38. If a state’s decisional law were applicable, the relevant state would be
New York, since under the choice-of-law rules assumed by the Supreme Court,
the law of the state where the bill was accepted applied. Id.
39. Id. at 18.
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the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.”40 It
would appear, therefore, that the Act would compel a federal
court to apply the “laws of the several states”—in particular
New York common law—to the facts.
Story admitted that the Act required federal courts sitting
in diversity to abide by any relevant state statutes.41 Furthermore, they were bound by state court decisions concerning local
usages, that is, common law concerning things “immovable and
intraterritorial in their nature and character.”42 But the Act did
not apply “to questions of a more general nature . . . as, for example, to the construction of ordinary contracts or other written instruments, and especially to questions of general commercial law.”43 If the common-law matter was general rather
than local, federal and state courts could each come to their
own judgment about the common law’s content.44
Almost a century later, a federal court in the Southern District of New York entertained another diversity action that was
to end the Swift regime.45 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins concerned an accident in Pennsylvania, in which Harry Tompkins
was hit by something protruding from a passing train operated
by the Erie Railroad Company.46 Tompkins sued Erie for negligence in federal court in New York, relying on diversity subjectmatter jurisdiction.47 Since Tompkins was a trespasser on
Erie’s property when the accident occurred, an important question was Erie’s common law standard of care.48

40. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1652 (2006)). When the Act was amended in 1948, “trials at common law”
was changed to “civil actions” to make it clear that the Act applied to actions
at equity. 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
41. See Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19.
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id. at 18–19.
44. See id. at 19 (“[T]he decisions of the local tribunals upon such subjects
are entitled to, and will receive, the most deliberate attention and respect of
this court; but they cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive authority, by
which our own judgments are to be bound up and governed.”).
45. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
46. Id. at 69.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006). Tompkins was a Pennsylvania citizen. Erie
was considered a New York citizen by virtue of being incorporated in that
state. This was prior to the amendment of the diversity statute in 1958 to
treat a corporation as a citizen of its state (or states) of incorporation and the
state “where it has its principal place of business.” Id. § 1332(c)(1).
48. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 70.
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Both Erie’s and Tompkins’s arguments relied upon Swift’s
distinction between local and general common law. Erie argued
that the question was local and pointed to decisions of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court holding that it could be found liable only if it acted with wanton or willful negligence.49 Tompkins argued that the question was general, allowing the court
to come to its own decision about Erie’s standard of care.50
Tompkins had a point: there was a long line of federal cases
holding that a railroad’s common-law duty of care to its passengers and employees was general, as one might expect given
the interstate character of train travel.51 On the other hand,
Tompkins was neither a passenger nor an employee—indeed,
he wasn’t on a train at all when the accident occurred, so the
case was difficult to characterize.
The trial court treated the matter as general and chose a
simple negligence standard, and the Second Circuit affirmed.52
But the Supreme Court reversed, choosing to overrule Swift,
even though the issue had not been briefed by the parties.53
Part of Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Erie pointed to the
practical disadvantages of the Swift regime.54 Since states refused to follow federal courts’ lead concerning the content of the
general common law, two common-law standards could be applied to any transaction, depending upon whether enforcement
was sought in federal or state court.55 What is more, the advantage of having the choice between these two standards was
granted in a discriminatory fashion.56 If the plaintiff was from
a different state than the defendant, she could choose between
these two standards by choosing between a state and a federal
forum. But a plaintiff from the same state as the defendant was
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 370 (1893)
(holding that the applicability of the fellow-servant rule to a railroad was a
matter of general common law); Lake Shore Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101,
106–07 (1893) (holding that a passenger’s right to punitive damages against a
railroad was a matter of general common law).
52. Tompkins v. Erie R.R. Co., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937).
53. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 82 (Butler, J., dissenting) (“No constitutional
question was suggested or argued below or here.”).
54. Id. at 74 –78 (noting that the application of Swift “had revealed its
defects”).
55. See id. at 74 (“Persistence of state courts in their own opinions on
questions of common law prevented uniformity.”).
56. See id. (“Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by noncitizens
against citizens.”).
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stuck with the common law as interpreted by the state court.57
The incentive to forum shop was great, often so great that a
plaintiff might change her citizenship solely to take advantage
of diversity jurisdiction.58
Another part of Brandeis’s opinion argued that the term
“laws of the several states” in the Rules of Decision Act was intended to include the general common law.59 So understood,
Erie was merely about statutory interpretation.
But Brandeis took his reading of the Act to be compelled by
two more fundamental considerations. The first was jurisprudential. He rejected Swift’s conception of the general common
law as “a transcendental body of law outside of any particular
State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute.”60 Law, he argued, including the common law, exists only
as the creation of some definite authority. It followed that the
common law to be applied in Erie was either federal common
law, rather than the brooding omnipresence in Swift, or the
common law of a state. It is at this point that constitutional
considerations came into play. Federal courts had no power,
Brandeis argued, to create common law governing the transaction in Erie.61 In particular, a grant of lawmaking power could
not be found in the decision to give them jurisdiction over diversity cases.62 As a result, the federal court in Erie was consti57. Or if the party making the choice was the defendant deciding whether
to remove from state court, only defendants who were from a different state
than the plaintiff had this option. At the time Erie was decided, a defendant
diverse from a plaintiff could remove under diversity even if the defendant
was a citizen of the state where the action was originally filed. This is no longer permitted. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006).
58. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 73 (discussing Black & White Taxicab & Transfer
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), in which a
taxi company chose to reincorporate in Tennessee for diversity purposes).
59. See id. at 72–73. In arguing that Congress intended the Act to cover
general common law, Brandeis relied heavily upon Charles Warren, New Light
on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923).
Warren’s reading of the Act has subsequently been questioned. See JULIUS
GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 502–03 (1971); William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The
Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984).
60. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. at 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
61. Id. at 78 (“[N]o clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a
power [to create common law] upon the federal courts.”).
62. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973)
(stating that a principle of Erie is that the constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction does not give federal courts the power to develop a “concomitant
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tutionally obligated to apply state common law, as decided by
the state’s courts.63
Notice that Erie held that a federal court does not have
lawmaking power by virtue of having subject-matter jurisdiction.64 That does not mean that it cannot have lawmaking powbody of general federal law”); see also Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The
Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 915–23 (1986); Paul J.
Mishkin, The Variousness of “Federal Law”: Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 798–
99 (1957); Adam N. Steinman, What is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does It
Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 245, 247–48 (2008).
63. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78–79. Brandeis appeared to assume that the only
common law available was Pennsylvania’s. He did not consider a federal
court’s Erie obligations when two or more states’ laws (for example, the laws of
Pennsylvania and New York) could permissibly be applied. For a discussion of
some puzzles that arise when a federal court may permissibly choose between
two states’ laws, see Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
64. In fact, even this principle must be qualified, for the grant of jurisdiction will give federal courts some power to create procedural common law, understood as common law that regulates the means by which substantive rights
are litigated in a court system. Cf. Erie, 304 U.S. at 91–92 (Reed, J., concurring) (“The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy but no one
doubts federal power over procedure.”); Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 846–52 (2008) (discussing the sources of federal
court’s authority over their own procedure). On the scope of this constitutional
power, see infra text accompanying notes 168–75.
But there is another Erie doctrine of nonconstitutional origin that limits
federal courts’ power to create federal procedural common law. Federal courts
are constrained by a “policy,” Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945),
that recommends uniformity between federal procedural common law and the
procedural law of the state where the federal court is located, if this is needed
to discourage vertical forum shopping and to avoid the inequitable administration of the laws. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466–69 (1965). The bulk of the
cases described as Erie problems by federal courts, as well as the bulk of the
Erie cases read in a first-year civil procedure course, concern this nonconstitutional question. E.g., Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497,
504 (2001); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426–31 (1996);
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 534–38 (1958); Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555–56 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer &
Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532 (1949); Guar. Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 109.
To make matters worse, there is yet another “Erie” doctrine that concerns
the validity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are not subject to
the same limitations as federal procedural common law. The validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure depends upon two considerations: whether it is
within Congress’s power to regulate the procedure of federal courts, and whether
it satisfies the limitations of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006),
in which Congress delegated its regulatory power to the Supreme Court. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469–74. For a recent discussion, see Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442–44 (2010).
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er for other reasons. Federal courts not only create interstitial
common law when required to fill in gaps in federal statutes,65
they sometimes create federal common law without any clear
statutory authorization. Some examples are cases involving the
rights and obligations of the United States66 and international
relations.67
This federal common law is arguably compatible with Erie,
since it satisfies the requirements in Brandeis’s opinion. It is
federal common law, not general common law of the Swiftian
variety, because it is the self-avowed creation of federal courts
and is binding upon state courts through the Supremacy
Clause.68 But federal courts have the power to create this common law not because of federal jurisdiction, but instead because
of sufficient “federal interests.”69
B. WHAT IF STATE COURTS DON’T WANT YOU TO FOLLOW THEIR
DECISIONS?
To modern eyes, Swift looks like federal encroachment
upon New York courts’ lawmaking powers. But it did not appear that way at the time. The reason is not merely that Justice Story’s opinion simply restated what was already an established practice in federal courts, which had a history of deciding
general common-law cases without deference to state decisions.70 More importantly, this practice probably did not usurp
powers that New York courts were claiming for themselves. As
Story noted, they would also have treated the issue in Swift as
a question of general common law: “It is observable that the
65. E.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253–57 (1978).
66. E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
67. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426–27 (1964).
For further discussion of the federal interests found sufficient to create federal
common law, see Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 630–44 (2006).
68. I will not discuss here the scope of federal courts’ power to make substantive common law. Some examples of the enormous literature on this topic
are Field, supra note 62; Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal
Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761 (1989); Louise Weinberg,
Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805 (1989).
69. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
70. FREYER, supra note 28, at 17–43; Fletcher, supra note 59, at 1516–21;
Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
1231, 1265 (1985) (“Long before Swift v. Tyson was decided, federal courts recognized the division between general and local law . . . .”).
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Courts of New York do not found their decisions upon this point
upon any local statute, or positive, fixed, or ancient local usage:
but they deduce the doctrine from the general principles of
commercial law.”71 New York state courts, he suggested, did
not consider their own decisions about the general principles of
commercial law to be binding upon federal courts.72
I think that Justice Story was probably right. The best evidence is the way that New York state courts would have adjudicated events in sister states. At the time that Swift was decided, most state courts followed the decisions of sister-state
courts only concerning local usages and the interpretations of
sister-state statutes. If the matter concerned the general common law—such as commercial law or the law merchant73—they
would opine about this law without any special deference to
what the sister state’s courts had said.74
Granted, if one looks to cases around the time Swift was
decided, it is hard to find an example of a state court explicitly
refusing to abide by a sister-state decision concerning the general common law. But this is because it was so hard for state
courts to get information about the decisional (or, indeed, statutory) law of sister states.75 Lacking such information, they
rarely knew whether they were contradicting a sister-state de-

71. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
72. See id. at 16–19.
73. I speak of the law merchant as common law, although they originally
had different sources. For the story of how the law merchant became part of
the common law, a process in which Justice Story played a role, see Charles A.
Bane, From Holt and Mansfield to Story to Llewellyn and Mentschikoff: The
Progressive Development of Commercial Law, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 351, 352–67
(1983).
74. See Crisson v. Williamson, 8 Ky. (1 A.K. Marsh.) 454, 455–56 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1819); Bradford v. Cooper, 1 La. Ann. 325, 326 (1846) (“It is a fact of
which we deem it to be our duty to take judicial notice, that the law-merchant
prevails throughout the States of this Union, except so far as the same may be
modified in particular States by statute.”); Brown v. Ferguson, 31 Va. (4
Leigh) 37, 42–44 (1832). I have not been able to find clear evidence from New
York courts themselves at the time that Swift was decided, but evidence can
be found in later cases. See St. Nicholas Bank v. State Nat’l Bank, 27 N.E.
849, 851 (N.Y. 1891); Faulkner v. Hart, 82 N.Y. 413, 418–19 (1880).
Tony Freyer claims that New York rejected Swift in Stalker v. M’Donald,
6 Hill 93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843). FREYER, supra note 28, at 46. In fact, all that
Stalker did was refuse to respect Swift’s conclusion about the relevant general
common-law standard. That is entirely compatible with its accepting Swift’s
position that the general common-law standard exists independently of the
decisions of state or federal courts. See Stalker, 6 Hill at 95.
75. Weinberg, supra note 68, at 822–23.
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cision. But the fact remains that they did not care whether they
were.76
Evidence that state courts were committed to the general
common law is even stronger after Swift was decided, since
many state courts, citing Swift, adopted their own horizontal
version of the doctrine—stating unambiguously that if a general common-law issue arose concerning an event in a sister
state, they could decide the matter without deference to the decisions of the sister state’s courts.77
Such cases provide critical evidence of how these state
courts believed their own decisions should be treated by sisterstate (and federal) courts. An example is Slaton v. Hall, decided
only nine years before Erie, in which the Georgia Supreme
Court reaffirmed its commitment to Swift:
The common law is presumed to be the same in all the American
states where it prevails. Though courts in the different states may
place a different construction upon a principle of common law, that
does not change the law. There is still only one right construction. If
all the American states were to construe the same principle of common law incorrectly, the common law would be unchanged.78

Because Slaton concerned an accident in Alabama, strictly
speaking it held only that Alabama decisions could be ignored
when interpreting the common law in Alabama. But its reasoning clearly applies to the common law in Georgia as well. The
Georgia Supreme Court must think that its own decisions can
be ignored by sister-state courts when they interpret the common law in Georgia.

76. Id.
77. Pattillo v. Alexander, 105 Ga. 482, 482 (1898); Franklin v. Twogood,
25 Iowa 520, 531 (1868); Roads v. Webb, 91 Me. 406, 412–13 (1898); Fellows v.
Harris, 20 Miss. (12 S. & M.) 462, 466–67 (1849); St. Nicholas Bank, 27 N.E.
at 851–52; Faulkner, 82 N.Y. at 418–19; Third Nat’l Bank of Springfield v.
Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 139 S.W. 665, 670 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911); Alfred Hill,
The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 541, 598 (1958).
This Swiftian approach to the common law should be distinguished from state
courts’ use of a rebuttable presumption that the law of a sister state is the
same as the forum’s. In the absence of evidence of the sister state’s law, a state
court employing the rebuttable presumption might apply even its statutory
law to the sister state. But this presumption would yield to concrete evidence
of the sister state’s law. For a discussion of this presumption, see Green, supra
note 63, at pt. III.A. In contrast, under the Swiftian approach, if the sister
state’s common law was at issue, the court would refuse to defer even to concrete evidence of the decisions of the sister state’s courts provided by the parties. See, e.g., Pattillo, 105 Ga. at 482.
78. Slaton v. Hall, 148 S.E. 741, 743 (Ga. 1929).
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It is likely, therefore, that New York state courts thought
that their decisions about the common law in New York could
be ignored by federal courts, since they would have ignored the
decisions of a sister state’s courts when interpreting the common law in the sister state.79 Story was treating the question in
Swift the way New York state courts wanted it to be treated.
Indeed, it is tempting to argue that Swift was compatible with
Erie, in the sense that Swift satisfied Brandeis’s demand that
federal courts respect state decisions concerning state law. After all, New York decisions were given exactly the effect in federal court that their creators intended them to have. Under
such a reading, the decision in Erie became necessary, not because the Supreme Court suddenly realized that it should respect state decisions, but because state courts began to understand their decisions as binding on federal (and sister-state)
courts. Constitutional law did not change. State law did. Such
an interpretation has recently been offered by Bradford Clark:
So long as state courts saw themselves as ascertaining and applying a
general body of law reflected by the decisions of multiple jurisdictions,
federal courts sitting in diversity were free to do the same. It was only
after states abandoned this approach in favor of state-specific rules
that the federal courts’ persistence in applying general commercial
law in diversity cases triggered serious constitutional concerns.80

But there is a problem with Clark’s interpretation. At the
time Swift was decided, not every state shared Story’s conception of the general common law. Even with respect to questions
of commercial law of the sort at issue in Swift, Connecticut appeared to treat the common law applicable in a sister state as
constituted by the decisions of the sister state’s courts, suggesting that it thought the same about the common law in Connecticut.81 If Story had been truly sensitive to state courts’ views
about the binding effect of their decisions, he would have made
an exception in Swift for Connecticut.
Furthermore, in the years between Swift and Erie other
states rejected the general common law in more pointed terms.
In Forepaugh v. Delaware Railroad,82 the Pennsylvania Su79. See supra note 74.
80. Bradford R. Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in
Constitutional Interpretation, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 708 (2008); see also Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1292–94
(2007) [hereinafter Clark, Constitutional]; Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common
Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1276–92 (1996).
81. Roe v. Jerome, 18 Conn. 138, 158–60 (1846); Brush v. Scribner, 11
Conn. 388, 407 (1836).
82. 128 Pa. 217 (1889).
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preme Court was asked to interpret the common law applying
to a contract entered into in New York. The plaintiff argued
that because the question concerned commercial law, New York
decisions could be ignored. Justice Mitchell’s response was
scathing:
It is not probable that the doctrine [of the general common law] would
ever have got a foothold in jurisprudence, and it would certainly have
been long ago abandoned, had it not been for the unfortunate misstep
that was made in the opinion in Swift v. Tyson. . . . Since then the
courts of the United States have persisted in the recognition of a
mythical commercial law, and have professed to decide so-called
commercial questions by it, in entire disregard of the law of the state
where the question arose.83

Although the narrow holding in Forepaugh was that Pennsylvania courts should defer to New York decisions concerning the
common law in New York, it spoke in general terms of the
common law of all states, including Pennsylvania.84 According
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, its decisions concerning
the common law in Pennsylvania are binding everywhere. And
yet after 1889 (the year Forepaugh was decided), federal courts
made no exception to the rule in Swift for Pennsylvania common law. They applied Swift to the common law of all states.85
Indeed, Clark appears to have things exactly backwards.
Instead of coming to the happy conclusion that both Swift and
Erie respected state courts’ views about the binding effect of
their decisions, we should instead be worrying that neither did.
Like Swift, Erie answered the question of whether state court
decisions are binding categorically, rather than on a state-bystate basis. Under Erie, a federal court deciding a common-law
case arising in Georgia is bound by the decisions of the Georgia
Supreme Court, even though the Georgia Supreme Court does
not want the federal court to be bound. In taking this categorical stance, Brandeis’s argument in Erie appears to violate his
own command to respect state courts on matters of state law.86
One solution to this puzzle is to bite the bullet and conclude that Brandeis was wrong to take a categorical approach.
The binding effect of state courts’ common-law decisions should
be answered by reference to state law. Indeed, the state-law so83. Id. at 228–29.
84. Id. at 227 (“The law of Pennsylvania consists of . . . the common law,
not of any or all other countries, but of Pennsylvania.”).
85. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
86. One person who has recognized this problem is Michael Dorf. See Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 709
(1995). For further discussion of Dorf ’s article, see infra note 178.

1126

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:1111

lution is suggested in Justice Holmes’s dissent in Black &
White Taxicab & Transfer Co.:
If a state constitution should declare that on all matters of general
law the decisions of the highest Court should establish the law until
modified by statute or by a later decision of the same Court, I do not
perceive how it would be possible for a Court of the United States to
refuse to follow what the State Court decided in that domain. But
when the constitution of a State establishes a Supreme Court it by
implication does make that declaration as clearly as if it had said it in
express words, so far as it is not interfered with by the superior power
of the United States. The Supreme Court of a State does something
more than make a scientific inquiry into a fact outside of and independent of it. It says, with an authority that no one denies, except
when a citizen of another State is able to invoke an exceptional jurisdiction, that thus the law is and shall be.87

Holmes assumed that under each state’s law, the decisions of
the state’s supreme court are binding upon federal courts. This
was a reasonable assumption, but with respect to states like
Georgia it was false. Had he recognized this, Holmes would apparently have agreed that a federal court deciding Georgia
common law should come to its own conclusion about what this
law is.
One might think that adoption of the state-law solution
would make little practical difference now. Haven’t all states
given up the Swiftian view of the common law? The truth, as
strange as it may sound, is that Slaton v. Hall is still good law
in Georgia. Georgia state courts still conceive of the common
law in Swiftian terms. Although they will apply a sister state’s
statute to events in the sister state and respect how its courts
have interpreted the statute,88 if the matter is governed by the
common law (including apparently local common law), they
come to their own judgment about what this common law is.89
87. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 534 –35 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
88. E.g., Calhoun v. Cullum’s Lumber Mill, Inc., 545 S.E.2d 41, 44 –45
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
89. E.g., Trs. of Jesse Parker Williams Hosp. v. Nisbet, 189 Ga. 807, 811
(1940); Calhoun, 545 S.E.2d at 45; Leavell v. Bank of Commerce, 314 S.E.2d
678, 678 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); see also John B. Rees, Jr., Choice of Law in Georgia: Time to Consider a Change?, 34 MERCER L. REV. 787, 789–90 (1983);
Weinberg, supra note 70, at 821 n.85. One might read these cases as simply
applying Georgia common law to events in sister states. Rather than conceiving of the common-law standard as transcending the decisions of any state,
Georgia would instead have an imperialist conception of its common-law standard as applying in all sister states. A few cases do put the matter this way.
E.g., White v. Borders, 123 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961) (“[T]he common law of Georgia rather than that of Tennessee will control in an action
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This suggests that they do not think that their own commonlaw decisions bind sister-state—or federal—courts. According
to the state-law solution, a federal court deciding a commonlaw case arising in Georgia should still exercise its own judgment about what Georgia common law is.90
C. POSITIVISM?
To avoid the state-law solution, we need to add a premise
to Brandeis’s argument in Erie—one that limits state courts’
power to control the binding effect of their decisions. The common-law decisions of the Georgia Supreme Court must bind
federal courts even if it does not want them to.
My guess is that most would argue that no premise needs
to be added. It is already there in Erie’s positivist mandate—
that is, the view that law “does not exist without some definite
authority behind it.”91 Legal positivism, in this sense, is the
brought in Georgia courts even though the injury occurred in Tennessee.”).
But this is an inaccurate description of Georgia’s approach. Under Georgia
choice-of-law rules for tort, the lex loci delicti—the law of the place of the accident—applies. Dowis v. Mud Slingers, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 413, 418–19 (Ga. 2005);
Bagnell v. Ford Motor Co., 678 S.E.2d 489, 492 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). If the accident occurs in a sister state, Georgia law cannot apply. The law applied must
instead be the law of the place of the accident. But if the question is not covered by a statute of the sister state, Georgia courts will exercise their own
judgment about what the common law applying in that sister state is. For example, in Risdon Enterprises v. Colemill Enterprises, 324 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1984), the Georgia Court of Appeals reaffirmed that the lex loci delicti
applied to a tort action concerning an airplane crash in South Carolina. Id. at
740. But since the matter was not governed by a South Carolina statute, but
by the common law, it insisted that it was “not bound by the interpretation
placed upon the common law by the [South Carolina] courts.” Id. at 741.
Because Georgia state courts use this Swiftian interpretive approach concerning sister-state law, federal courts in Georgia feel themselves compelled under Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941),
to do the same. E.g., Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 725 n.6
(11th Cir. 1987); In re Tri-State Crematory Litig., 215 F.R.D. 660, 677 (N.D.
Ga. 2003); Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 64 F. Supp. 2d 1340,
1343–44 (M.D. Ga. 1999). For a discussion, see Green, supra note 63, at pt. IV.
90. The state-law solution would have serious costs even if I am wrong
about Georgia courts’ Swiftian view of the common law, or they abandon this
view. The solution would also recommend looking to state law to decide how
unsettled issues of state law should be interpreted. This threatens federal
courts’ commitment to the predictive method, since the courts of some states
do not think that their unsettled law must be interpreted according to this method. See infra Part III. The state-law solution would also have important consequences for choice of law. See infra Part IV.
91. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black &
White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 532–36 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). Louise Weinberg has argued
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view that the law in a jurisdiction is ultimately determined by
the jurisdiction’s officials.92 In Slaton, the Georgia Supreme
Court arguably treated the common law as a brooding omnipresence that exists independently of its own or anyone else’s
authority. It took the common law to be binding in Georgia the
way that morality is binding in Georgia, that is, whether any
authority recognizes it or not. Since this conception of the
common law was rejected in Erie, federal courts may ignore
Slaton and take the Georgia Supreme Court’s decisions as binding, whatever the Georgia Supreme Court itself might think of
the matter.
But positivism cannot be Erie’s suppressed premise, because the Swiftian view of the common law is compatible with
positivism.93 A state supreme court can believe that the standard in the common law is binding domestically only because
it—or some other appropriate state authority—says so, while
insisting that the content of this standard is a question of fact,
concerning which federal courts can come to their own judgment. To see why this was the case, let’s begin with Larry Lessig’s positivist account of Swift.
Lessig emphasizes that the common law at issue in Swift
was the law merchant—understood as the custom of parties to
that Erie’s positivism applies to state as well as to federal courts. Louise
Weinberg, Back to the Future: The New General Common Law, 35 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 523, 550–51 (2004).
92. Current philosophers of law generally identify legal positivism by
means of two theses. According to the social fact thesis, the law of a jurisdiction is fundamentally identified by social facts (largely concerning the officials
in the jurisdiction). According to the separability thesis, the content of the law
need not overlap with the content of morality, although it often does so as a
contingent matter. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 241,
241 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
93. Much of my argument in this section echoes Jack Goldsmith and Steven Walt’s excellent Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L.
REV. 673 (1998). Like me, Goldsmith and Walt argue that Swift was compatible with positivism and thus that Erie’s conclusion that federal courts should
defer to state courts concerning state law cannot be justified by positivism
alone. But they understand this positivist Swift in one of two ways: Swift took
Article III to authorize federal courts to make an independent judgment about
the content of state law, or it concluded that federal courts have the power to
enforce a national common law. E.g., id. at 695. see also Steven Walt, Before
the Jurisprudential Turn: Corbin and the Mid-Century Opposition to Erie, 2
Wash. U. Jur. Rev. 75, 126 (2010). Because they ignore states’ own horizontal
version of Swift, they do not consider the possibility that federal courts were
justified in making their own judgment about the common law in a state because the state’s courts wanted them to.

2011]

ERIE’S SUPPRESSED PREMISE

1129

commercial transactions.94 Since commercial custom is a matter of fact, he argues that it was not odd that Story thought
that courts of different sovereigns could exercise their own
judgment about what the law merchant was. Each court was
simply trying to discover the common understanding of the parties to the contract being litigated. That a contract is entered
into under New York law does not mean that the facts about
the intentions of the parties to the contract cannot be decided
by the courts (or juries) of another sovereign that has jurisdiction of the case.95
94. Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in
Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1790–91 (1997); see also 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1, *67 (stating that the common law
is derived from “maxims and customs . . . of higher antiquity than memory or
history can reach”).
95. Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and
Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 427–28 (1995) (“Federal judges are as competent
as state judges in this scientific search for facts.”). As I have described Lessig’s
position, Story applied New York law in Swift. The federal court had the power to decide what the law merchant was only because New York authorities
made commercial custom a relevant fact to the case. Some defenders of Swift
did understand it as applying state law. Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 93, at
682–85. But others saw the law merchant as a form of national law that federal courts were authorized to enforce by virtue of the grant of federal jurisdiction for diversity cases. Id. at 685 & n.51. Even this national law merchant was
positivist, however, insofar as it was binding in the United States by virtue of
its recognition by federal courts. Furthermore, federal courts understood the
commercial custom recognized by the national law as a question of fact. State
courts were free to come to their own conclusions about what commercial custom was. For example, in Stalker v. M’Donald, 6 Hill 93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843),
decided one year after Swift, a New York court again denied that a promise to
discharge a preexisting debt was valid consideration when purchasing a bill of
exchange, and thereby rejected the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Swift.
The Supreme Court treated Stalker as a mere disagreement, not as a violation
of the Supremacy Clause. Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 343 (1857).
It might seem odd that the question of whether the law being enforced in
Swift had its source in state or federal authority was left open. But nothing
rode on answering the question. Under each interpretation commercial custom
was to be enforced, and under each the courts of other sovereigns could come
to their own judgment about what commercial custom was.
It is understandable, therefore, that Lessig, like Clark, claims that Swift
“created no affront to state sovereignty.” Lessig, supra note 95, at 428; see also
Lessig, supra note 94, at 1788 (“[Swift] ratified a practice that was wholly unremarkable, both at the state and federal level.”). Either Swift applied New
York law exactly the way New York courts wanted it to be applied, or it applied national law that came to exactly the same result that the application of
New York law would have. But Swift created no affront to New York’s sovereignty. Like Clark, Lessig ignores the fact that even at the time Swift was decided, Connecticut courts appeared to treat their decisions about the law merchant in Connecticut as binding everywhere. See supra text accompanying
note 81. Had he been concerned about respecting state courts’ views about the
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Because the content of the law merchant was understood
as a question of fact, Lessig believes that Story’s conception of
the common law was positivist:
Justice Story was speaking of the source of the common law, or more
precisely, the source of its substance. He was not speaking of the
source of its power. As any jurist from the time would have said, the
power of the common law comes from its adoption, or recognition, by a
domestic court.96

This is precisely how we understand the matter to this day. Although the customs that inform the mutual understandings of
the parties to a New York contract are a question of fact about
which federal or sister-state courts may make their own judgment, neither the customs nor the mutual understandings on
their own have the force of law. For that we need a legal authority in New York that recognizes them.
Lessig’s positivist reading of the law merchant is supported
by a state legislature’s power to override the enforceability of
the law merchant by statute. The New York legislature is able
to make commercial custom in New York a legal nullity at will.
To the extent that commercial custom is legally binding, it is
only because the New York legislature permits it to be.
One might question, however, why commercial custom was
thought legally binding until overridden by statute. It is unlikely, however, that this threshold legal enforceability was
thought to have its source outside any legal authority. Otherwise there would have been no reason for the thirteen colonies
upon independence to enact statutes or constitutional provisions receiving the common law.97 Later admitted states also
adopted the common law through statutes or constitutional
provisions.98 These efforts would have been unnecessary if the
binding effect of their decisions, Story would have answered the question on a
state-by-state basis. But he stated categorically that a state court’s decisions
concerning the law merchant are not binding on a federal court. A federal
court must treat the law merchant as fact even if the relevant state wants it
treated as law.
96. Lessig, supra note 94, at 1790.
97. Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the
United States, 4 VAND. L. REV. 791, 798–99 (1951). Most states did so almost
immediately after independence. Two laggards were Rhode Island, which did
not receive the common law until 1798, and Connecticut, which passed a reception statute in 1818. ELIZABETH GASPAR BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN
AMERICAN LAW: 1776–1836, at 24 (1964). For a discussion of the reception of
the common law in the United States, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 132–37 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
98. Hall, supra note 97, at 801–05. Furthermore, to the extent that courts
used common-law principles prior to the passage of a reception statute, they
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common law were legally applicable without any authority in
the state saying so.99
The example of the law merchant is enough to show that
positivism cannot explain Brandeis’s conclusion in Erie. According to Brandeis, a state supreme court’s common-law decisions
are always binding on federal courts sitting in diversity. No exception is drawn for law merchant cases. Federal courts must
treat the law merchant as law even if the relevant state supreme court wants it treated as fact.100 The reason cannot be
Erie’s positivist mandate, for, as we have seen, conceiving of
the law merchant as fact is compatible with positivism—and
indeed states probably understood the law merchant positivistically.
But the gap in Brandeis’s argument extends beyond the
law merchant to the expanded common law that arose later in
the nineteenth century. According to Lessig, this new common
law “was no longer reflective, or mirroring private understandings; it had become directive, or normative over those private
understandings.”101 It was understood as a special set of normative facts discoverable through a putative scientific method—normative facts applicable beyond contracts and commercial law to areas where the common understanding of the
made it clear that the principles were law by virtue of judicial decision. Id. at
800; see also Fitch v. Brainerd, 2 Day 163, 166 (Conn. 1805).
99. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1027
(2002). To be sure, reception statutes spoke of adopting the common law of
England. Georgia’s reception statute, for example, incorporated the “Common
Laws of England, and such of the Statute Laws as were usually in force in
[Georgia]” as of “the fourteenth day of May in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-six, so far as they are not contrary to the
constitution, laws and form of government now established in this State.” See
Act of Feb. 25, 1784, in 1 FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 290 (1981).
But this identification of the common law with a particular sovereign only provides further evidence that the common law was understood positivistically.
100. Since state common law of commercial paper has been largely displaced by the Uniform Commercial Code, and before that codified or incorporated by the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, Bane, supra note 73, at
367–77, it is hard to find a truly common-law commercial paper case after
Erie. But some common-law duties of banks not to honor checks have not been
superseded by the U.C.C. In such cases, federal courts treat the law merchant
in the state as law, without concern for whether the state wants it treated as
fact. E.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 374 F.3d
521, 526 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (applying Illinois common law); Fed. Ins.
Co. v NCNB Nat’l Bank of N.C., 958 F.2d 1544, 1550 (11th Cir. 1992) (applying Florida common law).
101. Lessig, supra note 94, at 1792.
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parties is less relevant, such as torts. It was at this point, Lessig argues, that the common law became antipositivist: “The
common law became, then, this self-sustaining body of normative authority, living through the articulations of the federal
judiciary alone.”102
Finally, in the twentieth century, this antipositivist general common law became increasingly suspect. Brandeis responded to the resurgent positivist vision of the common law in Erie
by compelling federal courts to defer to state courts concerning
the content of the common law in the state. Lessig agrees with
the prevailing view, therefore, that the decision in Erie was a
consequence of a positivist conception of the common law.103
The problem with Lessig’s reading is that, like the law
merchant, the normative common law can be understood positivistically.104 The distinction between the standard of the
common law (understood as a question of fact) and the reason
that this standard applies in the state (understood positivistically as resting in the decisions of the appropriate state authorities) is as applicable to the normative common law as it is to
the law merchant. That a state supreme court insists that the
standards in the common law are determined by normative
facts over which it has no control—and concerning which the
federal courts and the courts of sister states may exercise their
own judgment—is compatible with its thinking that the reason
that these standards legally apply in the state is because it or
the state’s legislature said so.105
The evidence that states did indeed understand the normative common law positivistically is the same evidence that they
102. Lessig, supra note 95, at 428.
103. Lessig, supra note 94, at 1793–94.
104. Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 93, at 693 (“[Lessig] does not explain
how a theory of law embraced by all parties to the debate and not ostensibly
central to it nonetheless played a dispositive causal role.”).
105. My argument here might appear to assume a form of inclusive legal
positivism, that is, the view that moral norms can be incorporated into a jurisdiction’s law, provided that this incorporation occurs through the decisions of
the appropriate legal authorities. Two contemporary inclusive legal positivists
are Jules Coleman and Will Waluchow. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE
PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL
THEORY (2001); W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994). Exclusive legal positivists, in contrast, insist that the law’s “existence and content
can be identified by reference to social facts alone, without resort to any evaluative argument.” JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE
MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 194 –95 (1994). Although I believe that my
argument is in fact compatible with exclusive legal positivism, I will not address the matter here.

2011]

ERIE’S SUPPRESSED PREMISE

1133

understood the law merchant positivistically. Like the law merchant, the normative common law could be overridden by state
statutes. The state legislature could make this body of normative facts a legal nullity within the state. To the extent that it
was enforceable, therefore, it was only because state authorities let it be. Furthermore, reception statutes were appealed to
in normative common-law cases as well as law merchant cases,
also suggesting that state courts conceived of the normative
common law as legally binding within their borders only because of decisions of the relevant state authorities.106
Indeed, if state courts truly thought that the normative
common law existed in a jurisdiction independent of the jurisdiction’s authority, they would have applied it to all foreign jurisdictions. But they did not apply it to civil law jurisdictions,107
including Louisiana,108 nor to jurisdictions that were neither
common nor civil law, such as Indian tribes.109 This demonstrates that state courts thought that the applicability of the
normative common law in a jurisdiction was fundamentally
answered by the decisions of authorities within that jurisdiction, insofar as it depended upon their historical choice of what
type of legal system to adopt.
Because the normative common law was positivist, Erie’s
positivist mandate had no effect on it. Those state supreme
courts committed to this normative common law probably recognized that it was legally binding only because they or other
appropriate state authorities said so. The question remained
whether the standards in this common law were fact or law.
And cases such as Slaton give us the answer. They were considered facts concerning which other courts could come to their
own judgment. This may have been a bad idea, but it was not
antipositivist.
106. E.g., Ector v. Grant, 37 S.E. 984, 985 (Ga. 1901) (appealing to the
Georgia reception statute to answer the common-law question of intestate succession); see Act of Feb. 25, 1784, supra note 99, at 290.
107. E.g., Banco De Sonora v. Bankers’ Mut. Cas. Co., 100 N.W. 532 (Iowa
1904) (Mexico); Savage v. O’Neil, 44 N.Y. 298, 300–03 (1871) (Russia); see also
Albert Martin Kales, Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 HARV. L. REV. 401,
402–04 (1906).
108. Int’l Text-Book Co. v. Connelly, 99 N.E. 722, 727 (N.Y. 1912) (“In the
absence of proof on the subject [such as a statute abrogating the common law],
. . . the common law is presumed to prevail in all the states in which it is the
foundation of their jurisprudence, such as New York and Pennsylvania, but
not including those states which inherited or adopted the civil law, such as
Louisiana.”).
109. Davison v. Gibson, 56 F. 443, 444 –45 (8th Cir. 1893) (Creek Nation).
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A positivist reading of the normative common law is not
undermined by skepticism about whether normative facts exist
in the same sense that facts about commercial custom do.
There might be no such thing as a normative fact—or no such
thing as a normative fact of the sort with which the general
common law is concerned. Or, assuming that there are such
facts, the way courts were supposed to identify them might be
fundamentally misguided. None of this makes the normative
common law any less positivist, nor does it license federal
courts to take a state supreme court’s decisions concerning the
normative common law as binding.
As an analogy, imagine that the Georgia Supreme Court
announces that, in an exercise of its lawmaking authority, the
law of Georgia henceforth includes the moral code in the Bible.
Imagine as well that it insists that because the content of the
Bible is a question of fact, federal courts and the courts of sister
states adjudicating events arising in Georgia should come to
their own conclusion about what the Bible says. What follows if
no coherent moral code can be drawn from the Bible? Not that
the Georgia Supreme Court’s conception of Georgia law is antipositivist. There still is no doubt that the Bible is legally relevant in Georgia only because the Georgia Supreme Court says
so. Nor does it follow that Georgia law is what the Georgia Supreme Court says is in the Bible. The Georgia Supreme Court
was clear that Georgia law is what is in fact in the Bible, not
what it thinks is in the Bible. All that can be concluded from
the inability to draw a rule of decision from the Bible is that
the content of Georgia law is indeterminate.110
Positivism cannot explain Brandeis’s conclusion that a
state supreme court’s common-law decisions always bind federal courts. As a result, Brandeis’s argument in Erie is still in
110. Even if one assumes that the common law articulated in Slaton is, for
some reason, anti-positivist, it still would not follow from Erie’s positivist
mandate that federal courts should follow Georgia decisions concerning the
common law. All that positivism tells us is that the common law that Slaton
spoke of does not exist. It cannot tell us what the Georgia Supreme Court will
do in response. And since a positivist conception of the normative common law
is possible, the Georgia Supreme Court might respond to Slaton’s demise by using its authority (authority it apparently thinks it should not have) to decree
that the normative common law applies in Georgia and that the content of this
common law is a question of fact. After all, this would be the best way to continue Slaton within the confines of Erie’s positivist mandate. It is clear, however, that Brandeis thought it unnecessary to predict the likely responses of
state courts to the end of the general common law. He thought it simply followed
from his argument that state courts’ decisions were binding on federal courts.
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trouble. Indeed, the difficulty extends beyond a state’s common
law to its promulgated law, that is, its statutes, regulations,
and constitution. Even at the time of Swift, federal courts generally deferred to state court interpretations of such law.111 But
they did not appear to recognize deference as their constitutional obligation.112 It was rather late, and particularly after
Erie, that deference was seen as constitutionally required.113
Once again, when the Court finally did impose this obligation
on federal courts,114 it ignored state law on the matter. It did
not consider whether a state court might want federal courts to
come to their own judgment about what the state’s promulgated law means.
The gap in Brandeis’s argument is duplicated in state court
cases that adopted Erie’s position horizontally. An example is
Forepaugh v. Delaware Railroad,115 in which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the decisions of sister states’ courts
concerning their common law are binding in Pennsylvania. Justice Mitchell appeared to believe that his conclusion followed
from positivism. “There is no such thing,” he argued, “as a general commercial, or general common law, separate from, and
irrespective of a particular state or government whose authority makes it law.”116 But all that follows from positivism is that
the common law is legally binding in a sister state only because
of the decisions of the sister state’s authorities. Once these sister-state authorities have decided to make the common law enforceable, the question remains whether the standard in the
common law should be treated as law or fact. Justice Mitchell
ignores what the sister states’ courts themselves have to say on
the matter.
111. See, e.g., Udell v. The Ohio, 24 F. Cas. 497, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1851).
112. See Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 205–07 (1863)
(refusing to recognize the holding of the Iowa Supreme Court invalidating
bonds under the Iowa Constitution); Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi:
The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1821, 1841 n.69 (2005); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The History of the
Judicial Impairment “Doctrine” and Its Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1388–89 (1992).
113. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 422 (1964) (attributing to Erie the position “that
federal courts must follow state decisions on matters of substantive law appropriately cognizable by the states”).
114. See Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177 (1940); Forsyth v.
City of Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 518–19 (1897).
115. 128 Pa. 217 (1889).
116. Id. at 226.
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II. THE SUPPRESSED PREMISE: NONDISCRIMINATION
To repeat, Erie cannot be understood as holding that federal courts must decide questions of state law as the state supreme court wishes them to. Otherwise, the extent to which a
state supreme court’s decisions bind federal courts would be up
to the state supreme court. But Justice Brandeis states categorically in Erie that federal courts are bound by a state supreme
court’s decisions. He does not consider what the state supreme
court might have to say about the matter. He must have assumed that state supreme courts’ power over the binding effect
of their decisions was limited. The question is why.
To identify this suppressed premise in Erie, I want to begin
with an analogue concerning full faith and credit for judgments. Let us assume that a state court has issued a judgment
in a lawsuit. To what extent does this judgment foreclose subsequent litigation? Within the rendering state court system, of
course, the effect of the judgment is determined by that state’s
law of claim and issue preclusion. But the Supreme Court has
held—with a small number of exceptions117—that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause requires the courts of sister states to
give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment that
the judgment would have under the laws of the rendering
state.118
Once again, our puzzle arises. This command to sisterstate courts sounds categorical. But what if the rendering state
wants sister-state courts to come to their own decision about
the judgment’s preclusive effect?
A. NONDISCRIMINATION CONCERNING JUDGMENTS
The Supreme Court has addressed this puzzle in Thomas
v. Washington Gas & Light Co.119 Thomas concerned full faith
and credit for a Virginia judgment awarding benefits under the
Virginia Workmen’s Compensation Act. A majority of the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the Virginia award did
117. E.g., Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 239 n.12 (1998) (holding that a Michigan state court injunction “is not entitled to full faith and credit
[in Missouri] . . . because it impermissibly interferes with Missouri’s control of
litigation brought by parties who were not before the Michigan court”); Fall v.
Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1909) (stating that a judgment purporting to determine title to real property need not be recognized by a court in the state of
the situs).
118. Baker, 522 U.S. at 223; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237–38 (1908).
119. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
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not preclude subsequent relief in a different court system, even
though such relief would not have been available in a Virginia
court,120 in effect creating an exception to full faith and credit.121 In the course of his opinion, however, Justice Stevens rejected a previous case on the matter, Industrial Commission v.
McCartin.122
In McCartin, the employer and employee, both citizens of
Illinois, contracted in Illinois for the employee to work in Wisconsin, where he was injured. The parties reached a settlement
concerning benefits under the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act. This settlement, which specifically stated that it did
“not affect any rights that [the plaintiff] may have under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Wisconsin,”123 was
then approved by an administrative tribunal in Illinois. The
Supreme Court concluded that the Illinois judgment approving
the settlement should not be understood to preclude a subsequent award in Wisconsin unless “some unmistakable language
by [the Illinois] legislature or judiciary would warrant our accepting such a construction.”124
Stevens rejected the McCartin rule, because it “authorizes
a State, by drafting or construing its legislation in ‘unmistakable language,’ directly to determine the extraterritorial effect of
its workmen’s compensation awards.”125 The McCartin rule
“represents an unwarranted delegation to the States of this
Court’s responsibility for the final arbitration of full faith and
credit questions.”126

120. Technically, since the question was the full faith and credit obligations
of a court in the District of Columbia, rather than a sister state, the relevant
obligations had their source in the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (2006). But in such situations, the obligations of the statute have been
understood as equivalent to those of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See
Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1318 (10th Cir. 1997).
121. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 286. The exception to full faith and credit created
by Thomas is not easy to characterize, even if one concentrates only on Justice
Stevens’s plurality opinion. But he found it significant that the Virginia Industrial Commission, which awarded the benefits, was statutorily prohibited
from applying benefits under the law of sister states. Id. at 280–85.
122. 330 U.S. 622 (1947). Although Stevens had only three other Justices
joining him in his opinion, Rehnquist and Marshall also signed on to the part
in which the discussion of McCartin occurred. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 290–91
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
123. McCartin, 330 U.S. at 624.
124. Id. at 628.
125. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 270.
126. Id. at 271.
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In support of his argument, Stevens quoted the following
passage from an article by Willis Reese and Vincent Johnson:
Full faith and credit is a national policy, not a state policy. Its purpose is not merely to demand respect from one state for another, but
rather to give us the benefits of a unified nation by altering the status
of otherwise “independent, sovereign states.” Hence it is for federal
law, not state law, to prescribe the measure of credit which one state
shall give to another’s judgment.127

In this passage, Reese and Johnson deny that full faith and
credit is simply about respect for the rendering state’s views
regarding the preclusive effect of its judgment. It is also about
what it means for states to coexist in the same nation—for
them to be part of the same legal system. As a result, full faith
and credit can restrict the rendering state’s power.
To be sure, the unity of the American legal system is not
complete. States retain some measure of sovereignty. This retained sovereignty expresses itself in the fact that the law of
preclusion is not fully federalized.128 Virginia can reject nonmutual collateral estoppel,129 for example, while California accepts
it.130 But full faith and credit does put an important limitation
on a state’s autonomy in this regard. The rendering state cannot control whether sister states must apply its preclusion law
to its judgments. As Stevens put it:
The Full Faith and Credit Clause “is one of the provisions incorporated into the Constitution by its framers for the purpose of transforming an aggregation of independent, sovereign States into a nation.” To vest the power of determining the extraterritorial effect of a
State’s own laws and judgments in the State itself risks the very kind
of parochial entrenchment on the interests of other States that it was
the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and other provisions
of Art. IV of the Constitution to prevent.131

127. Id. at 271 n.15 (quoting Willis L.M. Reese & Vincent A. Johnson, The
Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 161–62
(1949)).
128. Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 797 (1996) (“State courts
are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes.”).
129. TransDulles Ctr., Inc. v. Sharma, 472 S.E.2d 274, 275 (Va. 1996)
(“[C]ollateral estoppel in Virginia requires mutuality, that is, a party is generally prevented from invoking the preclusive force of a judgment unless that
party would have been bound had the prior litigation of the issue reached the
opposite result.”).
130. Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 982 P.2d 229, 237 (Cal. 1999)
(“[B]ecause [collateral] estoppel need not be mutual, it is not necessary that the
earlier and later proceedings involve the identical parties or their privies.”).
131. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 271–72 (quoting Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343,
355 (1948)).
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One worry about giving the rendering state the power to
determine the extraterritorial effect of its judgments is that it
might seek to obligate sister states to use its preclusion law
when otherwise no such obligation would exist.132 This would
be an obvious example of “parochial entrenchment on the interests of other States.”133 But the purpose of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause is also frustrated when the rendering state attempts to release sister states of their obligations to apply its
preclusion law. Indeed, the passage by Reese and Johnson
quoted by Stevens concerned “the rare case, such as McCartin,
where the first state declares explicitly that its judgment is to
be conclusive only within its own borders.”134
One might wonder what could be bad about a state giving
sister states the freedom to apply their preclusion law to its
judgments. Shouldn’t such self-sacrifice be encouraged? Keep in
mind, however, that we are speaking of a state that seeks to release sister states of what would otherwise be their constitutional obligation to use its preclusion law. To say that such a
constitutional obligation exists means that the Supreme Court
has determined that sister states’ interests are not sufficient to
permit horizontal disuniformity in the treatment of the state’s
judgments. By seeking to release sister states of this obligation,
the rendering state is setting its own judgment against the Supreme Court’s concerning this national policy in favor of legal
uniformity.
The point is not that sister states’ interests can never be
strong enough to permit them to apply their own preclusion law
to a judgment rendered in another state. The Supreme Court
132. It is a different question, which I will not discuss here, whether full
faith and credit permits the recognizing state at its own discretion to give a
judgment greater preclusive effect than it has under the rendering state’s law.
See, e.g., Hart v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 304 N.Y.S.2d 810, 812–14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1969) (applying New York’s law of nonmutual collateral estoppel to determine
the preclusive effect of decision by a court in Texas, even though Texas’s law of
collateral estoppel requires mutuality). But see Columbia Cas. Co. v. Playtex
FP, Inc., 584 A.2d 1214, 1217–18 (Del. 1991) (holding that a Delaware court
must use Kansas law of collateral estoppel, which requires mutuality, to determine the preclusive effect of a decision by a court in Kansas, even though
Delaware abandoned the mutuality requirement). For a discussion of the problem, see Gene R. Shreve, Judgments from a Choice-of-Law Perspective, 40 AM.
J. COMP. L. 985, 985–89 (1992).
133. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 261.
134. Reese & Johnson, supra note 135, at 161. I set aside here the complications added by the fact that McCartin involved the judicial approval of a settlement agreement. In such a case, the effect of the judgment arguably should
be understood solely as effectuating the parties’ contract.
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has recognized cases in which horizontal disuniformity is permissible. Exceptions to full faith and credit do exist.135 Indeed,
Thomas is one case in which an exception was recognized. The
question is whether it should be up to the rendering state what
the exceptions are.
One way of understanding Thomas is that the rendering
state’s right to full faith and credit is inalienable. In common
parlance, the inalienability of a right indicates its importance
or that it is especially protected from being abridged. But,
properly speaking, a right is inalienable when the protections
of the right cannot be altered by the right-holder.136 She lacks
the power to control her right. Under Thomas, if the rendering
state has a right that sister states give its judgment full faith
and credit, it has no power to change this right.
So far we have understood Thomas to prohibit Virginia
from controlling sister states’ duty to apply its preclusion law.
But imagine that Virginia’s preclusion law simply assigns different preclusive effects to a Virginia judgment depending upon
whether it is being recognized in a Virginia or a sister-state
court. In a Virginia court, the normal Virginia standards of
claim and issue preclusion apply. But sister-state courts are
given power, under Virginia law, to come up with whatever
preclusion standards they think are best.
In such a case, Virginia might legitimately deny that it was
seeking to release sister states of their duty to use Virginia
preclusion law. When the sister-state courts came up with their
own preclusion standards, they would be using Virginia preclusion law because they would be exercising powers delegated to
them by Virginia law. It is clear, however, that Stevens would
still find this impermissible, for, as he put it, a state may not
“directly . . . determine the extraterritorial effect” of its judgments.137 Virginia is not merely prohibited from freeing sister
states of the duty to use its preclusion law—it is also prohibited
from discriminating in its preclusion law on the basis of the jurisdiction of the recognizing court. Virginia can influence the
way a sister state treats a Virginia judgment only indirectly, by
determining the way the judgment is treated in its own court
system.

135. See supra note 117.
136. See generally A. John Simmons, Inalienable Rights and Locke’s Treatises, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 175 (1983).
137. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 270.
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One way of putting the limitation on the Virginia Supreme
Court is that it is obligated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause
to conceive of sister-state courts as coexisting with its own in a
unified nation. This prohibits it from varying the preclusive effect of Virginia judgments on the basis of the jurisdiction of the
recognizing court. The Virginia Supreme Court is permitted to
come up only with jurisdictionally neutral standards concerning their preclusive effect—standards that are applicable equally to sister-state courts.
The requirement of horizontal nondiscrimination applies to
a state’s preclusion law even when sister states have no full
faith and credit duty to apply the state’s law. Assume, for example, that a Virginia court issues a judgment purporting to
determine title to real property in New York. This is one area
where the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to full
faith and credit.138 A New York court has no obligation to apply
Virginia preclusion law concerning the judgment. But assume
it chooses to apply Virginia preclusion law anyway. It would
still be prohibited from giving effect to any Virginia rule that
discriminated on the basis of jurisdiction, since such a rule violates Virginia’s obligations under full faith and credit. For a
New York court to apply Virginia preclusion law must mean
giving a Virginia judgment the legal effect it would have in
Virginia courts.139
To repeat, there is a constitutional requirement, tied to the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, that a state’s preclusion law be
jurisdictionally neutral horizontally. But a similar nondiscrimination requirement applies vertically. Under the Full Faith
and Credit Statute,140 federal courts, with a few exceptions, are
also required to use the rendering state’s law when determining the preclusive effect of a state court judgment.141 The stat138. E.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 11–14 (1909) (holding that a Nebraska
court is not required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize the decree of a Washington court purporting to alter title to land in Nebraska).
139. One might argue, however, that the New York court would be free to
give effect to the discriminatory Virginia rule because that could be redescribed as the assertion of its own lawmaking power. I reject such a position at
infra note 153.
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
141. E.g., Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81
(1984) (“It is now settled that a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the
law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.”). The question of the
full faith and credit obligations of federal courts with respect to state judgments is complicated by the fact that the obligation is statutory. Congress
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ute surely incorporates Thomas’s requirements: the rendering
state may not control federal courts’ statutory duty to use its
preclusion law,142 and its preclusion law may not discriminate
on the basis of whether the recognizing court is domestic or
federal.143 For a federal court to use Virginia preclusion law
must mean that it is giving a Virginia judgment the same legal
effect it would have in Virginia courts, even if Virginia has said
the legal effect should be different.
B. EXTENDING NONDISCRIMINATION FROM JUDGMENTS TO LAWS
We have drawn from Thomas a requirement of jurisdictional neutrality binding a state’s preclusion law. The rendering state must assign its judgments the same preclusive effect
throughout the American legal system. We can now fill the gap
in Brandeis’s argument in Erie (and in Justice Mitchell’s argument in Forepaugh), by expanding this requirement of jurisdictional neutrality to state law in general, including to the common-law decisions of a state’s courts.144 A state supreme court
must give its common-law decisions the same legal effect
throughout the American legal system.
might expressly or impliedly repeal the Full Faith and Credit Statute. Repeal
is a particular concern if the action brought in federal court is under federal
law. The application of the rendering state’s preclusion law might frustrate
federal interests standing behind the federal law. Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A
General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 817–29 (1986); Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 996–97 (1998).
142. Indeed, since the recognizing court in Thomas was a court in the District of Columbia, strictly speaking, Thomas concerned the statute rather than
the clause.
143. It is also worth noting that a vertical nondiscrimination principle
should apply in the other direction to federal judgments in state courts. Although the exact constitutional source is uncertain, state courts are obligated
to give federal judgments the same preclusive effect they would have under
the law that would be applied in federal court. E.g., 18B CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4468 (2d
ed. 2002); Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 749
(1976). It should follow that federal courts cannot release state courts of this
duty, nor can they discriminate in their preclusion law on the basis of whether
the recognizing court is federal or state. Just what preclusion law will apply to
a federal judgment in federal court is a different issue, however, and a complicated one in diversity cases. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531
U.S. 497, 506–09 (2001).
144. The expansion of the nondiscrimination requirement in the Full Faith
and Credit Clause to all laws is suggested by Justice Stevens in Thomas.
Thomas, 448 U.S. at 271–72 (noting that the Full Faith and Credit Clause denies a state “the power of determining the extraterritorial effect of [its] own
laws and judgments” (emphasis added)).
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To make the analogy with Thomas clear, it is best to begin
with the attempt by a state to release sister states of what otherwise would be their constitutional obligation under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause to apply the state’s common law. Consider a suit by a Georgian against a Georgian concerning a
fight between the two that took place in Georgia. A New York
state court entertaining such a case would be obligated to use
Georgia law.145 To be sure, the constitutional limitations on its
power to apply New York law are weak. According to Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Hague, all it needs to satisfy the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, as well as the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,146 is “a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”147 Nevertheless, in this case the requirements in Allstate
are not satisfied.
Let us assume that the Georgia Supreme Court has a
common-law battery rule covering the matter.148 It has stated,
however, that the rule is binding only on Georgia state courts.
Sister-state courts are free to apply their own law to the fight.
One might think that in freeing sister-state courts of the duty
145. One might wonder how a New York state court would obtain jurisdiction of such a case. Since state courts are courts of general subject-matter jurisdiction, its primary jurisdictional hurdle is obtaining personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. But this would exist if the defendant was served within
New York while on a business trip there, Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S.
604, 628 (1990) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not prohibit the California
courts from exercising jurisdiction over petitioner based on the fact of in-state
service of process.”), or if the defendant consented. Such contact, although sufficient for personal jurisdiction, would still not satisfy Allstate. To be sure, our
New York state court is likely to dismiss the action, despite possessing jurisdiction, on forum non conveniens grounds. But examples where a court that is
constitutionally obligated to apply sister state law would not dismiss for forum
non conveniens can be found, such as a nationwide class action. Green, supra
note 63, at pts. II.C, III.C.
146. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”).
147. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981).
148. The Full Faith and Credit Clause applies not just to state statutory
law, but also to common law. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232
(1998) (speaking of “legislative measures and common law” as the “laws” to
which full faith and credit is due); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S.
430, 436 (1943) (referring to full “faith and credit . . . to which local common
and statutory law is entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United
States”); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for
Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 25–27 (1991); Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 45
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29 (1945).
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to apply its law, the Georgia Supreme Court is showing admirable self-sacrifice. It has allowed sister-state courts to take
their own interests into account. But we are speaking of an
area in which the Supreme Court has concluded that only
Georgia has a legitimate regulatory interest. It has decided
that sister-state interests cannot justify horizontal disuniformity in the legal standard applied. It is not for the Georgia Supreme Court to undermine this national policy in favor of legal
uniformity.
Let us now assume that the Georgia Supreme Court instead insists that the proper common-law standard in battery
cases under Georgia law is a matter which sister-state courts
are permitted to come to their own judgment. Of course, the
Georgia Supreme Court is free to decide what its own commonlaw battery rule is. But, as we saw in connection with full faith
and credit for judgments, it cannot discriminate on the basis of
jurisdiction to surreptitiously release sister states of their duty
to apply its law. And that is just what the Georgia Supreme
Court’s approach does. It assigns different legal effects to its
common-law decisions on the basis of whether the decision is
being recognized by a Georgia or a sister-state court.
Notice that the Georgia Supreme Court cannot respond
that sister-state courts should be free to decide the standards
in Georgia common law because the question is one of fact rather than law. The point is not that it is forbidden from treating
what most states would describe as law as fact.149 The court
can claim that the standard for common-law battery in Georgia
is a factual question, concerning which the adjudicating court
(or its jury) may exercise its own judgment—although it might
thereby render Georgia law dangerously indeterminate. But
this distinction between law and fact must be applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion. It cannot treat the standard as fact for
sister-state courts, and as law for Georgia state courts. If the
question is truly a factual one, then Georgia state trial courts
must treat it as a question of fact as well. They must be permitted to come to their own conclusions about the common law in
Georgia, without deference to the decisions of the Georgia Supreme Court.150 On the other hand, if the Georgia Supreme
149. For a skeptical view about the ability to distinguish between law and
fact in any formal manner, see Lawrence Alexander, What’s Inside and Outside the Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
150. Furthermore, it is arguable that there should be no appellate review
of their decisions or that such review, rather than being de novo, should be ac-
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Court insists that its decisions are binding on Georgia state
courts, they must be binding on sister-state courts as well.
Let us now expand our argument vertically. If a federal
court were adjudicating the Georgia fight, it would—absent
some federal statute or federal interest giving it lawmaking
power—be obligated under Erie also to apply Georgia law.151
And just as the Georgia Supreme Court cannot permit sisterstate courts to apply sister-state law, so it cannot permit federal courts to apply federal law. Here, too, it might at first appear
that by permitting federal courts to apply federal law the Georgia Supreme Court is expressing a commendable spirit of selfsacrifice—since it is allowing federal courts to adjudicate the
fight in accordance with federal, rather than Georgia, interests.
But we are speaking of an area in which the Supreme Court,
interpreting Erie, has concluded that there are no legitimate
federal regulatory interests. It is not for the Georgia Supreme
Court to undermine this national policy in favor of vertical uniformity.152
And, once again, the Georgia Supreme Court cannot use
discrimination in its laws to accomplish what it could not do directly. It cannot assign different legal effects to its common-law
decisions on the basis of whether the decision is being considered by a Georgia or a federal court. The Georgia Supreme
Court must treat federal courts as coexisting with Georgia state
courts in a single legal system. The binding effect of its decisions must be jurisdictionally neutral.
In making this argument, I have concentrated on cases in
which federal and sister-state courts are obligated under Erie
and full faith and credit to apply a particular state’s law. But
the requirement of jurisdictional neutrality applies even when
this is not true. Consider two New Yorkers who get into a fight
in Georgia. One New Yorker brings suit against the other in
New York state court. Although, under Allstate, the court could
cording to the deferential standard reserved for questions of fact. See infra
note 155.
151. As for the federal court obtaining jurisdiction for such a case, subjectmatter jurisdiction would be the primary constitutional hurdle. Although
there would be no federal subject-matter jurisdiction under diversity, a federal
court might get jurisdiction over the action under supplemental jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006).
152. Although I will not discuss the matter here, the same principle should
apply to federal common law too. Assume that the Supreme Court creates a
federal common-law rule. It may not free state courts of their duty, under the
Supremacy Clause, to abide by its decision, except by freeing lower federal
courts of the same duty.
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apply New York common law of battery, assume that it chooses
to apply Georgia common law instead. It still must ignore
Georgia’s Swiftian view of Georgia common law. To the extent
that the Georgia Supreme Court’s views about the legal effect
of its common-law decisions are not jurisdictionally neutral,
they are invalid under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. For a
New York state court to apply Georgia common law can only
mean giving Georgia decisions the same legal effect they would
have in Georgia courts.153
A similar situation could arise, although more rarely, in a
vertical context. Sometimes a federal court that has lawmaking
power—due to the presence of a sufficient federal interest—
makes the decision to use state law anyway.154 If such a federal
court applies Georgia common law, it would not be permitted to
give effect to Georgia’s Swiftian view of this common law. To
the extent that the Georgia Supreme Court’s views about the
legal effect of its common-law decisions are not jurisdictionally
neutral vertically, they are invalid under Erie. For a federal
court to apply Georgia common law can only mean giving Georgia decisions the same legal effect they would have in Georgia
courts.
Notice that jurisdictional neutrality is required of all Georgia Supreme Court decisions—not just those interpreting its
common law. The Georgia Supreme Court may free sister-state
and federal courts from the duty to defer to its interpretations
of Georgia statutes only if it frees lower Georgia courts of the
153. Could one argue that the New York court is permitted to give virtual
effect to the Georgia Supreme Court’s Swiftian view of Georgia common law
and interpret Georgia common law as it sees fit, since that could simply be redescribed as the permissible exercise of its own lawmaking power? The answer
to this question rests on whether the discretionary choice to apply sister-state
law can generate full faith and credit duties to interpret this law with fidelity.
If the New York court, having chosen to apply Georgia common law, is obligated to interpret this law correctly, it cannot give effect to the Georgia Supreme Court’s Swiftian view of Georgia common law since that is not a valid
part of Georgia law. Some have argued that lawmaking power frees the forum
of any duty to interpret nonforum law with fidelity. Note, Misconstruction of
Sister State Law in Conflict of Laws, 12 STAN. L. REV. 653, 653 (1960). In
Green, supra note 63, at pt. V, I argue that if the forum with lawmaking power
uses standards drawn from sister-state law in order to foster its own regulatory purposes, the law applied should be understood as forum law and no full
faith and credit obligations apply. On the other hand, if—as is usually the
case—it uses sister-state law out of deference to the regulatory interests of the
sister state, the law applied is truly sister-state law and the forum has a duty
under full faith and credit to interpret this law correctly.
154. For a discussion, see Green, supra note 63, at pt. V.A.
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same duty. Since the Georgia Supreme Court considers lower
Georgia state courts bound by its interpretations of Georgia
statutes, sister-state and federal courts must also be bound.155
The requirement of nondiscrimination explains why Brandeis could conclude in Erie that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s decisions were binding on federal courts, whether or not
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said they were binding. It
was enough to know that these decisions were binding upon

155. Indeed, it is not clear that freeing Georgia’s lower courts of a duty to
follow its decisions would be sufficient for the Georgia Supreme Court to permit sister-state and federal courts to do the same. Consider the example of
Louisiana. Owing to Louisiana’s civil-law tradition, the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s decisions interpreting Louisiana statutes are not binding upon lower
Louisiana courts, except in the particular case in which the decision was
made. Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 128 (La. 2000); Constr. Materials, Inc. v. Am. Fid. Fire Ins. Co., 388 So. 2d 365, 367 (La. 1980). Some have
argued that federal courts are therefore permitted to come to their own interpretation of a Louisiana statute, without considering themselves bound by the
decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court. Black v. Rebstock Drilling Co., 837
F. Supp. 200, 204 –05 (W.D. La. 1993); Alvin B. Rubin, Hazards of a Civilian
Venturer in a Federal Court: Travel and Travail on the Erie Railroad, 48 LA. L.
REV. 1369, 1372–76 (1988). As it turns out, however, federal courts follow the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s interpretations of Louisiana statutes and, when
the matter is unsettled, attempt to predict how it would resolve the matter.
E.g., Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1999); Transcon.
Gas v. Transp. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 1992); St. Charles Ventures, L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 682, 687 (E.D. La. 2003) (“To
determine a state law question, we first look to decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court. If the Louisiana Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue, it
is our duty to determine as best we can what that court would decide.”).
Are federal courts insufficiently sensitive to Louisiana’s unique Gallic heritage? Not necessarily. Even though a Louisiana trial court is not bound by
Louisiana Supreme Court decisions, the matter can be appealed up to the Louisiana Supreme Court. If it disagrees with the trial court, its decision is binding in the case being adjudicated. Under the predictive method, a federal court
interpreting a Louisiana statute should seek to replicate, not a Louisiana trial
court’s decision on the matter, but how the case would turn out in the Louisiana state court system generally, including the possibility of appeal. See infra
Part III.A; cf. Dorf, supra note 86, at 714 (“[A] federal court sitting in diversity
does not see itself anywhere within the state court hierarchy.”). Since a federal
court should identify with the Louisiana court system and we assume that
there would have been a successful appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court if
the case had been litigated there, a federal court would still be obligated to abide
by the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decisions. The only way that federal courts
might be released of the duty to follow the Louisiana Supreme Court’s interpretations of Louisiana statutes is if Louisiana trial courts were not merely
free to ignore the Louisiana Supreme Court’s interpretations, but also if the
interpretations made by Louisiana trial courts were not subject to appeal (or,
perhaps, not subject to de novo appeal).
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Pennsylvania state courts.156 It followed from nondiscrimination that they must be binding on federal courts.157
156. Technically, the gap in Brandeis’s argument is not completely filled,
for he still ignored the possibility that the state supreme court released even
the courts of its own state of the duty to abide by its common-law decisions.
But given that this is exceedingly unlikely—and indeed would probably mean
that the state had no common law at all—he cannot be blamed for ignoring
this possibility.
157. It might appear that this Article seeks to resurrect an equal protection
justification of Erie. E.g., Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 998–99 (1996). The only difference in my argument would be that it was state (rather than federal) courts
that violated equal protection in Swift—by discriminating concerning the
binding effect of their decisions on the basis of jurisdiction. Thus, the Fourteenth, rather than the Fifth, Amendment would have been violated.
One problem with such an equal protection reading of Erie, of course, is
that there was no Fourteenth Amendment when Swift was decided. We would
have to conclude, therefore, that Swift was valid when it was decided, and that
Erie was necessary only after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
something not suggested in Justice Brandeis’s opinion. Cf. Clark, Constitutional, supra note 80, at 1299 (rejecting the Fifth Amendment equal protection
reading of Erie because “at the time the Court decided Erie, it had not yet interpreted the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause to (reverse) incorporate
an equal protection component applicable to the federal government”). But
there are other reasons to reject an equal protection reading of Erie. Such a
reading would focus on the interests of the parties before the court. But the
primary problem with the Georgia Supreme Court treating its common-law
decisions as binding only on Georgia state courts is not that it discriminates
against certain groups of litigants. Indeed, since Georgia thinks that not only
federal but also sister-state courts can come to their own judgment about
Georgia common law, it is not clear exactly what group is being discriminated
against. A plaintiff does not have to be from a different state than the defendant
to get a different interpretation of Georgia common law. All he has to do is sue
in another state. The real problem with Georgia’s approach is that it fails to respect the place of sister-state and federal courts in the American legal system.
This Article models its argument on Thomas, which prohibited a state
from discriminating in the preclusive effect of its judgments on the basis of the
jurisdiction of the recognizing court. Justice Stevens derived this nondiscrimination principle, not from equal protection, but from the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. I argue Stevens’s argument can be extended from a state’s preclusion
law to its law in general—and in particular to the common-law decisions of its
courts. Thus, in my argument the prohibition on horizontal discrimination has
its source, as it did in Thomas, in the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Although
the Clause would appear to apply only to sister-state courts—obligating them
to obey a state supreme court’s common-law decisions—I believe it also puts a
duty of jurisdictional neutrality on the state supreme court itself. A state supreme court cannot treat as relevant to the legal effect of its common-law decisions whether the effect is in a domestic or sister-state court. As for the prohibition on vertical discrimination, this has its source, not in equal protection,
but in Erie. Although Erie appears to bind only federal courts—obligating
them to obey a state supreme court’s common-law decisions—it puts a duty of
vertical jurisdictional neutrality on the state supreme court.
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That Brandeis relied upon a nondiscrimination principle in
Erie should not be surprising, for the Court has recognized similar nondiscrimination principles in other circumstances.158 In
Railway Co. v. Whitton, for example, the Court held that Wisconsin’s wrongful death statute could not prohibit actions under the statute from being entertained by federal courts.159 The
Wisconsin statute was not allowed to discriminate vertically
against federal jurisdiction.
A horizontal example, cited by Stevens in Thomas, is Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. George.160 George held that
a Georgia court could entertain an action under Alabama’s
workers’ compensation statute even though the statute limited
jurisdiction to courts in Alabama. Because the Alabama statute
horizontally discriminated against sister-state jurisdiction, it
violated full faith and credit.161
158. One such case is Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951), which is commonly understood as holding that a state court may not refuse to entertain an
action simply because it is under the law of a sister state. For a discussion of
Hughes, see Lea Brilmayer & Stefan Underhill, Congressional Obligation to
Provide a Forum for Constitutional Claims: Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules
and the Conflict of Laws, 69 VA. L. REV. 819, 825–26 (1983); Larry Kramer,
Same Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy
Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1980–86 (1997). Notice that our nondiscrimination principle is the mirror image of Hughes’s. In Hughes, there was discrimination in state jurisdiction concerning sister-state law. We are concerned with
discrimination in state law concerning sister-state (and federal) jurisdiction.
159. Ry. Co. v. Whitton, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 285–86 (1871).
160. 233 U.S. 354 (1914) (cited in Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S.
261, 271 n.15).
161. Id. at 359–60. It might seem incompatible with a nondiscrimination
reading of George that the Court relied upon the fact that the Alabama cause
of action was transitory—as evidenced by the fact that it could be brought in
any court in Alabama. The Court suggested that had the Alabama statute
made it clear that an action under the statute is nontransitory—for example,
by insisting that it can be brought only before a particular court in Alabama—
the Georgia court would have been forbidden to entertain it. But this is arguably compatible with a nondiscrimination reading. In such a case, Alabama
would have decided where actions under the statute could be brought on the
basis of a criterion that applied to some Alabama as well as sister-state courts.
If there were good reasons for allowing actions under the statute to be brought
only before, say, the Alabama workers’ compensation board, rather than in a
court of general jurisdiction in Alabama, there would arguably be nothing discriminatory about using these same reasons to prohibit the actions in sisterstate courts.
In Crider v. Zurich Insurance Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965), it appeared as if the
Supreme Court went even further and concluded that a state may never make
a cause of action nontransitory. The Court held that it was not a violation of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause for an Alabama state court to take jurisdiction of an action under the Georgia Workmen’s Compensation Act, even
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To be sure, in these cases the discrimination was extreme,
since the state sought to totally divest federal and sister-state
courts of the ability to entertain actions under its law. Furthermore, the discrimination was negative, since federal and
sister-state courts were given less freedom than domestic
courts possessed. But since, as these cases show, the Supreme
Court can compel a state to allow federal and sister-state jurisdiction for its causes of action, and it has put on the federal and
sister-state courts an obligation—under Erie and full faith and
credit—to respect the decisions of the state’s courts when interpreting these causes of action, it is hardly a stretch that
Brandeis concluded that the state’s supreme court itself has a
duty—again under Erie and full faith and credit—not to disrupt federal and sister-state courts’ interpretive duties through
discrimination concerning the binding effect of its decisions.
On the other hand, if I am wrong and state supreme courts
may engage in such discrimination, I think we have to conclude
Justice Brandeis’s argument in Erie fails. Whether state supreme court decisions bind federal courts must be answered by
reference to state law. Given the continued vitality of Slaton, a
federal court should exercise its own judgment about what
Georgia common law is.
C. SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
To sum up, I have argued that the Erie doctrine and the
Full Faith and Credit Clause prohibit state supreme courts
from discriminating in the legal effect of their common-law decisions. For federal and sister-state courts to apply a state’s
common law must mean that they give the decisions of the
state’s supreme court the same legal effect they have in the
state’s own courts.
But assume that the Georgia Supreme Court has a common-law rule stating that a plaintiff in a battery suit must provide the defendant with in-hand service of the summons and
complaint. It certainly seems permissible for it to release federal and sister-state courts of any duty to apply this service rule,
though the Act stated that a remedy could be provided only by the Georgia
Compensation Board. But the Court appeared to treat the case as one in which
Alabama had sufficient contacts to permissibly displace Georgia law on the
jurisdictional limitation with Alabama law—not that Georgia law itself could
not make a cause of action nontransitory. It is probable, therefore, that a state
court without sufficient contacts to apply forum law would be bound to respect
a sister state’s treatment of its actions as nontransitory, provided that the sister state did not violate our nondiscrimination principle.
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even when they are applying Georgia battery law. But because
lower Georgia courts must apply the service rule, this looks like
a violation of the duty of nondiscrimination.
The solution is to draw a distinction between what is regulated by Georgia’s battery law and its service rule. The battery
law regulates nonlitigation activities (such as people fighting in
Georgia). But the service rule does not. It is procedural in the
sense that it regulates only how suits brought in Georgia state
courts proceed. So understood, the service rule would fail to be
jurisdictionally neutral only if the Georgia Supreme Court
claimed that sister-state and federal courts were permitted to
use their own standards when determining whether service in
a battery action in Georgia state court was adequate.162
Notice that we cannot rely upon a state’s own characterization of its law as substantive or procedural. Otherwise, it could
circumvent its duty of nondiscrimination simply by designating
as procedural its decisions about substantive rights under its
law. For example, the Georgia Supreme Court could give effect
to its Swiftian view about Georgia common law by claiming
that its common-law decisions are actually procedural rules
that are applicable only in Georgia state courts.
The Supreme Court touched upon the problem of a state’s
duty to treat its law as substantive in Sun Oil v. Wortman,
which held that a Kansas state court had no constitutional obligation under full faith and credit to apply Texas’s statute of
limitations, even though it was entertaining a Texas cause of
action.163 Drawing upon international law at the time of the
ratification of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Justice Scalia
concluded that “the society which adopted the Constitution did
not regard statutes of limitations as substantive provisions,
akin to the rules governing the validity and effect of contracts,
but rather as procedural restrictions fashioned by each jurisdiction for its own courts.”164 Noting that Texas did not treat its
statute of limitations as substantive and thus did not want its
limitation to follow the Texas action into a Kansas court, Scalia
argued that the question the Court was facing was whether
162. This might arise if a Georgia judgment were being collaterally attacked in federal or sister-state court on grounds of inadequate service.
163. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 729 (1988).
164. Id. at 726; see also Great W. Tel. Co. v. Purdy, 162 U.S. 329, 338–39
(1896) (holding that full faith and credit for the rendering state’s judgment
does not require the recognizing state to use the rendering state’s statute of
limitations for enforcing such judgments).
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Texas was constitutionally compelled “to consider [its] statutes
of limitations substantive.”165 He concluded it was not.
Because statutes of limitations (and service rules) may be
treated by a state as procedural under Sun Oil, Georgia would
not be understood as jurisdictionally discriminating concerning
its battery law simply because it denied that its battery statute
of limitations or service rule was binding on sister-state courts.
On the other hand, it should not be able to surreptitiously enforce its Swiftian view of Georgia common law by claiming that
its common-law decisions are actually procedural rules that are
applicable only in Georgia state courts. In such a case, the Supreme Court could identify the decisions as constitutionally
substantive, and so binding on sister-state courts, whatever
Georgia itself might say about the matter.
I do not want to suggest that it will always be easy to determine when a state has wrongly designated its substantive
law as procedural and so has violated our horizontal nondiscrimination principle. After all, it is not always easy to tell
whether a forum has abused its power over procedure to escape
its full faith and credit obligations to apply a sister state’s substantive law.166 But the difficulty of answering the latter question has not prevented the Supreme Court from trying.167
A constitutional distinction between substance and procedure is also needed in a vertical context, in order to determine
whether a state gives its substantive law the same legal effect
165. Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 729 n.3. In fact, Scalia considered the issue of
Texas’s power to designate its statute of limitations as procedural in the context of a challenge under the Due Process Clause, rather than the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, although it is not clear what rested upon this categorization. Id.For an example in which a state understands its statute of limitations
as following its causes of action into foreign courts, see Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S.
451, 454 (1904).
166. For an example of a court catching a state legislature attempting to
use its control over procedure to wiggle out of its full faith and credit obligations concerning sister-state judgments, see City of Philadelphia v. Bauer, 478
A.2d 773, 778–80 (N.J. 1984). In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court
struck down a New Jersey statute that prohibited the enforcement of employment wage tax judgments through the sale of realty. The statute was enacted
in response to the passage in Philadelphia of a commuter tax. The court held
that the New Jersey statute, although apparently procedural, violated New
Jersey’s full faith and credit obligation to respect Pennsylvania commuter tax
judgments.
167. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935) (holding that a state
“may not, under the guise of merely affecting the remedy, deny the enforcement of claims otherwise within the protection of the full faith and credit clause,
when its courts have general jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties”). For a discussion of Broderick, see Kramer, supra note 158, at 1984 –86.
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in federal courts as in its own. Although the Supreme Court
has not dealt with this problem, it has dealt with the converse
problem of a federal court abusing its power over procedure to
escape its obligations under Erie to apply a state’s substantive
law. Here it has drawn constitutional distinctions between substance and procedure that determine the limits of the federal
court’s obligations.
Notice that I am speaking here of the limits of a federal
court’s power over procedure due to its constitutional obligation
under Erie to apply state substantive law. There is a very different Erie doctrine, of nonconstitutional origin, that puts limits on federal courts’ ability to create procedural common law
when entertaining state law actions. They are constrained by a
“policy”168 that recommends uniformity with the procedural law
of the state where the federal court is located if this is needed
to discourage vertical forum shopping and to avoid the inequitable administration of the laws.169 For example, if a federal
court in New York were entertaining our Georgia battery action, this policy of uniformity would recommend that the federal court use New York’s statute of limitations (or, more accurately, the statute of limitations that would be used by a New
York state court), rather than a federal common-law limitation,
because a difference between the federal and the New York limitations would promote vertical forum shopping and the inequitable administration of the laws. Most cases described as Erie
problems by federal courts concern this nonconstitutional question.170
One of the few cases in which the Supreme Court has dealt
with the constitutional distinction between substance and procedure in an Erie context is Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric
Cooperative.171 The question in Byrd was whether a South Carolina law requiring that an element of a South Carolina cause
of action be decided by a judge would apply when the action
168. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
169. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965). Many characterize the
nonconstitutional doctrine as having its source in the Rules of Decision Act.
See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 707–
18 (1974); Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1637 (1998); Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips,
Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91
HARV. L. REV. 356, 361 (1977). Although I do not think that this can be the
statutory source of the policy, I will not take on the matter here.
170. See supra note 64.
171. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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was entertained by a federal court.172 Justice Brennan noted
that as a constitutional matter Erie required federal courts sitting in diversity to “respect the definition of state-created
rights and obligations by the state courts,” including state practices “bound up with these rights and obligations.”173 Beyond
that area, the “policy” in favor of uniformity between state and
federal procedure applied.174
To be sure, in Byrd, Brennan comes dangerously close to
saying that a federal court is constitutionally bound under Erie
to respect a state’s own views about which elements of the
state’s laws and practices are bound up with state-created
rights and obligations. The result of such an approach would be
that a state would have the power, by claiming that the entirety of its procedural law is bound up with its substantive law, to
displace all federal procedural common law when federal courts
entertained the state’s actions. Likewise, the Georgia Supreme
Court would be permitted, by claiming that its common-law decisions were not bound up with substantive rights under its
common law, to give effect to its Swiftian view of Georgia common law in federal court.
It is more likely that Brennan meant to identify an independent constitutional distinction between substance and procedure of the sort articulated in full faith and credit contexts.175
Under this standard, Georgia would not be understood as having violated Erie simply because it freed federal courts of the
duty to apply its service rule or statute of limitations. But it
would have violated Erie if it treated its common-law decisions
as procedural rules binding only on Georgia state courts.

172. Id. at 534.
173. Id. at 535.
174. Id. at 536. Although some doubt has been expressed about the viability of Byrd in light of subsequent Supreme Court cases, such doubts concern an
issue independent of that discussed here; namely, whether a federal court, in
deciding whether forum state law not bound up with state rights and obligations should be applied in a federal court, should look to “countervailing” federal interests. See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 62, at 267–69 (questioning
whether Gasperini endorsed Byrd’s examination of countervailing federal interests). This doubt is not directed at Byrd’s delineation of the constitutional
scope of Erie. But see Lindsey C. Boney IV, Forum-Shopping Through the Federal Rules of Evidence, 60 ALA. L. REV. 151, 173 n.129 (2008).
175. Indeed, the constitutional Erie distinction between substance and procedure is likely the same as the full faith and credit distinction, although I will
not argue for this point here.
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III. THE PREDICTIVE METHOD
Up to this point, we have been concerned with the puzzle of
a state supreme court that seeks to free federal and sister-state
courts of the duty to respect decisions that it has actually (and
recently) issued concerning the state’s law. But a similar puzzle
arises concerning unsettled state law—which I will understand
broadly as legal issues that have not been definitely resolved by
the state’s supreme court, either because it has never dealt
with the matter or because a past resolution might be overruled
if revisited.
A. WHAT IF STATE COURTS DON’T WANT YOU TO PREDICT THEIR
DECISIONS?
The Supreme Court has indicated that a federal court addressing an unsettled issue of state law must predict what the
state supreme court would do.176 It should defer to the decision
that would exist if the unsettled issue had been brought up in
the state court system and ultimately been appealed to the
state’s supreme court. Although the Supreme Court has suggested that the predictive method follows from Erie,177 it did
not take into account state law on the matter. What if the state
supreme court does not care if federal courts use the predictive
method concerning its unsettled law? What if it considers the
method for interpreting its unsettled law to be a procedural
question that can be answered by federal courts as they see fit?
Wouldn’t this mean that, with respect to that state’s unsettled
law, the use of the predictive method is not a matter of constitutional concern?178
176. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 249 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967); King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153, 161 (1948); see also
19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4501 (2d ed. 1996); Dorf, supra note 86, at 705–06. For a discussion of some of the nuances of the predictive method, see Bradford R. Clark,
Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1495–517 (1997).
177. Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465 (noting that the predictive method “is but an
application of the rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . . . where state law as announced by the highest court of the State is to be followed”).
178. In Prediction and the Rule of Law, Michael Dorf entertains the possibility that the interpretation of state law by federal courts might be determined by state law and thus that the appropriateness of the predictive method
might depend upon the state whose law is being interpreted. Dorf, supra note
86, at 710–14. But Dorf considers only the possibility that a federal court
might look to a state’s approach to the interpretation of unsettled state law
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This puzzle, although similar to our first, is even more
pressing, because the courts of many states—not just a single
outlier like Georgia—appear to believe that the predictive
method need not be used by sister-state or federal courts to decide unsettled questions of their law. Once again, the evidence
is the way these states treat the unsettled law of sister states.
Many states take the position expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. How a state court ascertains
the content of sister-state law is treated by the Restatement as
an evidentiary or procedural issue that can be decided as the
forum sees fit, in accordance with its own law.179 Probably because it is the easiest method when evidence of sister-state law
is insufficient, the Restatement recommends that the forum
presume in such cases that the law of the sister state is the
same as its own.180 Some states that have adopted this presumption are Illinois,181 New York,182 Maine,183 and Newithin the state’s own lower courts. Thus, he suggests that a federal court
might be obligated under Erie to use the predictive method concerning New
York law if lower New York courts also decided cases on the basis of predictions of the New York Court of Appeals’s likely decision. Id. at 714. In the end,
he concludes that relations between a state’s lower courts and its highest court
of appeals are irrelevant to how a federal court should decide in a diversity
case, “because the federal court sitting in diversity does not see itself anywhere within the state court hierarchy.” Id. But Dorf ignores the possibility
that New York might have principles for how federal (or sister-state) courts
should interpret New York law. Under New York law a federal court deciding
an unsettled issue of New York law might be freed of any duty to predict the
New York Court of Appeals’s decision. That is the puzzle we are now facing.
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 136(2) (1969).
180. Id. § 136 cmt. h. The presumption should not be applied, however,
“when to do so would not meet the needs of the case or would not be in the interests of justice,” for example, when the expectations of the parties would be
frustrated. Id. The obligation to respect the expectations of the parties is
weaker than the predictive method, however. A federal court sitting in diversity has an obligation to decide as it predicts the relevant state supreme court
would even when the parties did not rely on the state supreme court’s likely
decision. The obligation to interpret state law with fidelity is one to the state
itself, not to the parties.
181. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 746 N.E.2d 1242, 1254 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2001), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005); Soc’y
of Mount Carmel v. Nat’l Ben Franklin Ins. Co. of Ill., 643 N.E.2d 1280, 1293
n.4 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Ellerbrake v. Campbell-Hausfeld, No. 01L 540, 2003
WL 23409813, at *2 (Ill. Cir. July 2, 2003).
182. Knieriemen v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 10, 15
(App. Div. 1980); Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Calhoon, 270 N.Y.S.2d 691, 696 (Sup.
Ct. 1966). But see Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1003 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding
ambiguity as to whether the presumption is still in place under New York law).
183. ROC-Century Assocs. v. Giunta, 658 A.2d 223, 226 (Me. 1995).
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braska.184
Such a presumption is incompatible with the predictive
method. Under the predictive method, a federal court faced
with inadequate evidence of state law remains obligated to
predict how the state’s supreme court would decide.185 It may
not presume that unsettled state law is the same as federal
law. To be sure, a federal court may look to any relevant decisions of federal courts, as well as the courts of sister states, as
evidence of the state supreme court’s likely decision.186 But
similarity to federal law is not presumed, because federal decisions are irrelevant when federal courts take a minority approach to the issue or the general assumptions standing behind
them are different from those of the state whose law the federal
court is interpreting.
The presumption of similarity to forum law can be significant for certifying nationwide class actions. Those seeking to
certify the class bear the burden of showing that questions of
law and fact common to the class predominate over questions
affecting the individual members.187 If the plaintiffs have causes of action that arise under a number of states’ laws, the difference between these laws can frustrate certification.188 But if
the presumption is used, it will be the defendant who must
show that the sister states’ laws differ from the law of the forum. When sister states’ laws are unsettled, she will not be able
to overcome the presumption, making class certification easier.189
Whether a state employs the presumption is often evident,
therefore, in the way it approaches certification. For example,
Texas had a tradition of assigning to the defendant the burden
of showing that the various state laws applying to the members
184. Am. Honda Fin. Corp. v. Bennett, 439 N.W.2d 459, 462 (Neb. 1989).
185. The types of evidence a court should use is catalogued in McKenna v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 663 (3d Cir. 1980).
186. Id.
187. E.g., Patrick Woolley, Erie and Choice of Law After the Class Action
Fairness Act, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1723, 1740 (2006).
188. E.g., Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class
Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2002–05 (2008).
189. For a discussion of the use of the presumption in class action certification, including when these actions are brought in federal court, see Green, supra note 63, at pt. III.C; Russell J. Weintraub, Choice of Law as an Impediment to Certifying a National Class Action, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 893 (2005);
Patrick Woolley, Choice of Law and the Protection of Class Members in Class
Suits Certified Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(B)(3), 2004 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 799, 801–17; Woolley, supra note 187, at 1740.
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of the plaintiff class were different from forum law.190 But recently the Texas Supreme Court held that the burden is on the
class proponent to show that state laws are not different.191
This suggests that Texas does not employ a presumption of
similarity to forum law.
As we saw in connection with Slaton, the way a state court
interprets the law of sister states is evidence of how it believes
its own law should or may be interpreted. This is particularly
true when its interpretive approach is applied to all sister
states, without sensitivity to how sister states’ courts themselves wish their law to be interpreted. When the Georgia Supreme Court held in Slaton that Alabama common law may be
interpreted without deference to the decisions of the Alabama
Supreme Court, it did not look to particular Alabama decisions
that suggested that a lack of deference was what the Alabama
Supreme Court wanted. Its reasoning was instead applicable to
the common law of all states—including Georgia.
Accordingly, the fact that Texas courts refuse to employ the
presumption of similarity to forum law concerning unsettled
sister-state law suggests that they think that sister-state and
federal courts should not use the presumption concerning unsettled Texas law. By the same token, New York courts must
think that their unsettled law may be interpreted in accordance
with the presumption. And this generates our puzzle. If New
York courts do not care whether unsettled New York law is interpreted using the predictive method, on what grounds can the
Supreme Court claim that federal courts are constitutionally
obligated to interpret New York law according to this method?
Of course, even if our puzzle is set aside, there are considerable doubts about whether the predictive method is required
by Erie. Under the predictive method, a federal district court
interpreting unsettled state law does not mimic how a trial
court in the state would decide the matter. Instead, it seeks to
duplicate how the issue would have been decided in the state
court system as a whole, with the possibility of appeal. Assume,
for example, that the state supreme court issued a decision on
190. Microsoft Corp. v. Manning, 914 S.W.2d 602, 613 (Tex. App. 6th 1995);
Osborn v. Kinnington, 787 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. App. 8th 1990).
191. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 673 (Tex. 2004)
(“As ‘guardian[s] of absent claimants’ rights, courts have an independent duty
to determine uniformity [of various states’ laws] sua sponte, even if neither
party raises it.’” (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 954
(Tex. 1996))). The Montana Supreme Court came to the same conclusion. See
Sieglock v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 81 P.3d 495, 499 (Mont. 2003).
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point long ago that it would likely overrule if it took the case on
appeal now. In general, a state trial court must apply the old
decision. It is not permitted to apply the rule that it predicts
the state supreme court would use now.192 If a federal court
adopted the trial court’s perspective, the rule it applied could
seriously diverge from the rule that would be applied in the
state court system as a whole. It is for this reason that the predictive method looks to the state supreme court’s likely decision.
But the predictive method can fail to track how the case
would turn out in the state court system as well. After, all, the
trial court’s decision might not have been appealed to the state
supreme court. Or, if appeal had been sought, the state supreme court, although strongly inclined to overrule its old decision, might not have granted appeal at that moment.193
I do not take a stand here on whether the predictive method is the best way of satisfying Erie. Perhaps things would be
better if a federal court were required to act like a state trial
court.194 Or maybe federal courts should always abstain from
hearing actions with unsettled questions of state law,195 or
should always certify such questions to the state’s supreme
court.196

192. E.g., Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 427 A.2d 1121, 1129 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); Himes v. Stalker, 416 N.Y.S.2d 986 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
Lower federal courts are likewise bound by old Supreme Court decisions, even
if they predict that the U.S. Supreme Court would decide differently now.
Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1364 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.) (“We
have been told by our judicial superiors not to read the sibylline leaves of the
U.S. Reports for prophetic clues to overruling.”), vacated, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
193. E.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601 (McKinney 1995) (granting the right of appeal only in a narrow set of cases).
194. This was arguably the approach that the Supreme Court originally
took to the matter. See Stoner v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464, 467 (1940);
West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236–37 (1940); Six Cos. Of Cal. v.
Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180, 188 (1940); Fid. Union Trust Co. v.
Field, 311 U.S. 169, 178 (1940).
195. The Supreme Court has held, however, that a federal court may not
abstain from hearing a case over which it has federal jurisdiction simply because an issue of state law is unsettled. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320
U.S. 228, 234 (1943).
196. Clark, supra note 176, at 1544 –63. Indeed, it might even be better if
federal courts decided on the basis of principles latent in state decisions, even
if they believed that the state supreme court would not be true to these principles if it decided the case. E.g., Dorf, supra note 86, at 695–715; Robert A.
Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1423–31 (2005).
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But all the alternatives that have been offered share with
the predictive method the view that a federal court’s interpretation of unsettled state law is a matter of constitutional concern. The alternative approaches are recommended because
they are thought to do the best job of satisfying a federal court’s
duty under Erie.197 No one considers the proper interpretive
method to be a purely procedural or evidentiary matter concerning which federal courts are free to adopt any approach
they like. And yet that is precisely how many states see the
matter. Given that these states have sought to free federal
courts of any obligation to use the interpretive method recommended under Erie (which I will now assume, for simplicity of
argument, is the predictive method), why do federal courts
refuse to consider themselves free?
B. NONDISCRIMINATION, AGAIN
We are now in a position to solve this puzzle. There are only two ways that a federal court can be free of a constitutional
duty to use the predictive method. The first is if the method for
interpreting a state’s unsettled law is constitutionally procedural—it is, to use Justice Brennan’s language in Byrd, not
“bound up” with state rights and obligations. If that is the case,
however, the Supreme Court has been wrong to consider the
predictive method a matter of constitutional concern. Federal
courts are in fact constitutionally free to adopt any method of
interpreting unsettled state law they see fit.198 They could, for
example, presume that unsettled state law is the same as federal law.
On the other hand, let us assume that the method for interpreting a state’s unsettled law is constitutionally substantive—it is “bound up” with state rights and obligations.199 If
197. E.g., Clark, supra note 176, at 1564; Dorf, supra note 86, at 710–15.
198. Their choice would, however, be subject to the nonconstitutional Erie
doctrine. They might be required to choose the method that the courts of the
state where they are located use for interpreting unsettled sister-state law, in
order to avoid forum shopping and the inequitable administration of the laws.
See Green, supra note 63, at pt. IV; supra note 64.
199. In an important new article, Abbe Gluck has recently argued that
rules of statutory interpretation should be subject to Erie. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as ‘Law’ and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2011). Although she does not distinguish between the constitutional and the nonconstitutional Erie doctrines, see supra
note 64, her argument lends support to the notion that rules of statutory interpretation are constitutionally substantive, that is, bound up with state
rights and obligations. If so, not only would a federal court in New York inter-
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this is so, a state supreme court might still be able to give federal courts the freedom to come up with their own method of interpreting the state’s unsettled law, for example, if it understood the appropriate method as a factual question to be
decided by each court. But our nondiscrimination principle
would apply. If the matter is factual for federal courts, it must
be factual for the state’s trial courts as well.
For example, to permit federal courts to come up with their
own method of interpreting unsettled New York law, the New
York Court of Appeals would have to permit New York trial
courts to come up with their own methods as well.200 Since no
state has ever given their trial courts such freedom, it is understandable that the Supreme Court has recommended a uniform approach to the interpretation of unsettled issues of state
law, without considering state law on the matter.
The same argument applies horizontally. The Full Faith
and Credit Clause forbids a state supreme court from freeing
sister-state courts of their duty to interpret its unsettled law
according to the predictive method—except through inconceivable changes in the way its unsettled law is treated in its own
courts. Sister states must use the predictive method concerning
a state’s unsettled law, whatever the state itself might say
about the matter.201

preting a Pennsylvania statute have a constitutional obligation to use Pennsylvania’s rules for statutory interpretation, Pennsylvania would be prohibited
from freeing the federal court of this obligation.
200. Furthermore, the individualized decision of the New York state trial
court would have to not be subject to appeal—or at least de novo appeal—in
that system. See supra note 155.
201. In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, the Supreme Court held that even when
sister-state courts are constitutionally obligated to apply a state’s law, they
may adopt any interpretation of the state’s law that they wish, provided that
the interpretation does not “contradict law of the other State that is clearly
established and that has been brought to the court’s attention.” 486 U.S. 717,
731 (1988). This means that sister-state courts are not obligated to use the
predictive method concerning unsettled state law and indeed can presume
that this law is the same as their own. In Green, supra note 63, at pt. II.C, I
argue that the Court conflated the interpretive duties of sister-state courts
under full faith and credit with the circumstances under which the Supreme
Court would review whether those duties have been violated. In that article, I
did not consider our puzzle, however. What difference would it make to the
sister-state courts’ duties if the state whose unsettled law was being interpreted did not care whether its law was interpreted according to the predictive
method? In this Article, I fill that gap.

1162

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[95:1111

IV. CHOICE OF LAW
In this Article, I have used the nondiscrimination principles latent in Erie and the Full Faith and Credit Clause primarily to put established areas of the law, such as the predictive method, on a firmer and more intellectually satisfying
footing. I want to end with a brief suggestion that the principles might compel radical changes to another area: choice of
law.
Assume that a Vermont state court is entertaining a negligence action brought by a wife against her husband concerning
an accident in Pennsylvania. The couple is domiciled in New
York. New York law allows interspousal suits, but Pennsylvania prohibits them unless the defendant was reckless (something not alleged in the wife’s complaint). Which state’s law
should the Vermont court apply? This problem is usually conceived as one to be answered by Vermont’s choice-of-law rules.
Since the question is whether Pennsylvania or New York law
should be chosen, it cannot be answered by the law of Pennsylvania or New York.
But this is a mistake. The question is not yet whether
Pennsylvania or New York law should be chosen. There is no
choice to make if one of the state’s laws does not apply to the
facts, for example, if Pennsylvania’s prohibition on interspousal
suits does not apply to non-Pennsylvanians who get in accidents in the state. And how is this question to be answered except by looking to the decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court?202 Isn’t the scope of Pennsylvania law whatever the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would say it is? Wouldn’t the
Vermont court be violating its obligations under full faith and
credit if it held that Pennsylvania law applies when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not?
One way of putting this point is that the choice-of-law rules
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would use to determine
whether Pennsylvania law applies can be constitutionally substantive, in the sense that they define the scope of Pennsylva-

202. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 569–74 (1996); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 303 (1990); Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1005–08 (1991) [hereinafter Kramer, Renvoi]; Roosevelt,
supra note 112, at 1884. For older examples, see JOHN WESTLAKE, A TREATISE
ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 25–41 (5th ed. 1912); Erwin N. Griswold,
Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1186–87 (1938).
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nia law.203 If Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law rules are bound up
with the state’s rights and obligations, it follows that the Vermont court cannot use Vermont choice-of-law rules when deciding whether Pennsylvania law applies. It must use the rules
that would be used by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
And yet every choice-of-law method used by state courts—
from the traditional approach, as exemplified in the First Restatement, to more modern interest-analysis approaches—
refuses to defer to a sister state’s supreme court when determining whether the sister state’s law may be applied to interjurisdictional facts. Consider the traditional approach, which employs fairly rigid rules that select a state’s law on the basis of
whether a localizing event occurred within that state. It would
recommend Pennsylvania law, because the lex loci delicti—or
law of the place of the harm—applies in tort cases.204 If our
Vermont court used the First Restatement, it would choose
Pennsylvania law even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, using a method different from the First Restatement or disagreeing about whether the case should be characterized as tort,
would hold that Pennsylvania’s prohibition on interspousal
immunity does not apply to non-Pennsylvanians who get into
accidents in the state.205
Modern interest analysis suffers from the same problem.
Although it can take a variety of forms—from the classical interest-analysis approach of Brainerd Currie,206 to the Second
203. Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 202, at 1043–44; Roosevelt, supra note 112,
at 1883.
204. States still using the traditional lex loci delicti rule for torts are Alabama, Georgia, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of
Law in American Courts in 2008: Twenty-Second Annual Survey, 57 AM. J.
COMP. L. 269, 279–80 (2009).
205. An example of such a case is Yates v. Lowe, 348 S.E.2d 113, 113–14
(Ga. Ct. App. 1986). The Court of Appeals of Georgia applied Florida interspousal immunity law to a Georgia couple who got into an accident in Florida.
Id. It did not consider the fact that two years earlier a Florida court, using
Florida’s modern interest analysis approach, had held that its interspousal
immunity law does not apply to non-Floridians who get into accidents in Florida. Pennington v. Dye, 456 So. 2d 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
Indeed, the First Restatement is explicit that the choice-of-law rules of
foreign jurisdictions should be ignored by the forum, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 (1934), making an exception only in cases of title to
land and the validity of a decree of divorce. Id. § 8. In these two situations, the
doctrine of renvoi is used. See infra note 212.
206. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1963). No state explicitly adopts all of Currie’s approach, although all modern
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Restatement,207 to Leflar’s choice-influencing considerations,208
to Baxter’s comparative impairment209—all modern approaches
take seriously the idea of looking to the purposes standing behind a state’s law when determining whether it applies to a
transaction that crosses state borders. If Vermont used a modern approach, it would likely claim that the purposes of Pennsylvania’s interspousal immunity law—such as encouraging
marital concord and preventing collusive suits between spouses
to collect insurance proceeds—would not be implicated concerning non-Pennsylvania couples. For this reason, it would conclude that Pennsylvania law does not apply, even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, using the First Restatement, would
have applied Pennsylvania law to the facts.210
Although for at least a century a minority of choice-of-law
scholars has argued that some choice-of-law rules should be
treated as substantive,211 recently the position has gained momentum.212 What is distinctive about contemporary propoapproaches are heavily influenced by it. Symeonides, supra note 204, at 278–80.
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1969). This is the
most prevalent approach, used by at least twenty-two states for torts. Symeonides, supra note 204, at 279–80.
208. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law,
41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966); Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on ChoiceInfluencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966). This approach (also
known as the “better law” approach) is used by Arkansas, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin for torts. Symeonides, supra note
204, at 279–80.
209. William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1963). Baxter’s approach is arguably used in California. Symeonides,
supra note 204, at 279; see also Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 721–
24 (Cal. 1976).
210. An example from a contract case is Dillard v. Shaughnessy, Fickel &
Scott Architects, Inc., 943 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). The Missouri Court
of Appeals, using the Second Restatement, applied Kansas law to interpret a
contract entered into in Missouri, on the ground that the subject matter of the
contract was a building project in Kansas. Id. at 715–19. But Kansas state
courts accept the traditional view that the law of the place of contracting controls. A Kansas court, therefore, would have held that Kansas law does not
apply. Once again, this fact was considered irrelevant.
211. E.g., WESTLAKE, supra note 202, at 34; Griswold, supra note 202, at
1186–87. For a meticulous discussion of older cases pro and con, see JOHN
PAWLEY BATE, NOTES ON THE DOCTRINE OF RENVOI IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1904).
212. Discussion of this issue has largely occurred in the context of the socalled renvoi problem in choice of law. But renvoi in fact addresses a different
issue. Renvoi had its origin in the traditional approach. To see how it was
supposed to work, consider Yates v. Lowe, 348 S.E.2d 113, 113–14 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1986), in which a Georgia court, using the traditional approach, concluded that Florida law on interspousal immunity applied to a Georgia couple
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nents—such as Lea Brilmayer, Larry Kramer, and Kermit Roosevelt—is that they emphasize the Swiftian nature of prevailing choice-of-law approaches,213 and recommend their reformation in the spirit of Erie (sometimes via the Full Faith and
Credit Clause).214
But their Erie lacks the suppressed premise. The goal is to
show respect for a state supreme court’s views about the territorial scope of its law.215 And if respect is all that is at issue, no
reform in choice of law is needed. A state supreme court’s
choice-of-law decisions can be ignored for the simple reason
that it thinks they can be ignored. After all, that is precisely
what it does concerning the choice-of-law decisions of sister
states.
Consider, once again, Georgia’s Swiftian approach to the
common law. Georgia courts ignore sister-state decisions when
deciding what the common law in those sister states is. From
this it followed that they think their own decisions concerning
who got into an accident in Florida. Renvoi begins with a fundamental question: What is meant by “Florida law”? Florida’s law prohibiting interspousal
suits (the “internal” law of Florida)? Or the law that Florida courts would apply (the “total” law of Florida)? If it is the latter and Florida courts, using a
modern choice-of-law approach, would say that Georgia law applies, then applying “Florida law” would mean applying Georgia law (whether internal or
total). This is the renvoi (“sending back” or “sending away” in French). Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 202, at 980 n.3.
With a small number of limited exceptions, the traditional approach rejected renvoi. If the forum’s choice-of-law rules say Florida law applies, Florida’s internal law is chosen, not the law that Florida courts would apply.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 7–8 (1934). On the one hand,
this is a violation of the obligation to respect a state court’s views concerning
the scope of its law. The forum will apply Florida law even when a Florida
court would not. But it is not necessary to adopt renvoi to respect Florida decisions concerning the scope of Florida law. Respecting Florida decisions means
taking Florida courts’ application of Georgia law to mean that Florida law does
not apply. Under the doctrine of renvoi, their application of Georgia law is taken
to mean that Georgia law applies. That is a matter for Georgia courts to decide.
213. E.g., Lea Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A
Challenge, 35 MERCER L. REV. 555, 563 (1984); Kramer, Renvoi, supra note
202, at 986–87; Roosevelt, supra note 112, at 1840–41, 1863–64, 1889–90.
214. Lea Brilmayer, The Problem of Provenance: Constructing a Positive Law
Foundation for Choice of Law, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Donald Earl Childress III ed., forthcoming); Roosevelt, supra note 112, at 1841.
215. Kramer and Roosevelt, for example, both draw distinctions between
when the sister state’s courts wish their choice-of-law decisions to bind the forum and when they do not. Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 202, at 1028–53; Roosevelt, supra note 112, at 1869–87. They do not always agree on the particulars. Id. at 1878–84 (disagreeing with Kramer’s interpretation of the First
Restatement). But they both ignore the evidence provided by the way the sister state’s courts treat the choice-of-law decisions of other states.
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Georgia common law can be ignored by sister-state courts. As
far as choice of law is concerned, every state is Georgia. Whether it uses the First Restatement or a modern approach, every
state court thinks it can ignore sister-state decisions when determining the territorial scope of sister-state law. From this it
follows that every state court thinks its own decisions can be
ignored by sister states.
That state courts do not care if their choice-of-law decisions
are followed is, I believe, the fundamental reason that the
Brilmayer-Kramer-Roosevelt position has always been in the
minority.216 It is no help for them to argue that the majority
approach fails to recognize that a state’s choice-of-law rules can
be substantive.217 Even if that is so, the question remains
whether they are binding on sister-state and federal courts.
Since the state’s own courts do not think they are binding, it
seems disrespectful to disagree.
Things would come to a head if a courageous state gave up
its Swiftian approach to choice of law and demanded that sister-state and federal courts respect some or all of its choice-oflaw rules when determining the territorial scope of its law. But
since no state has taken this stand,218 Erie and full faith and
credit—understood as commanding respect for state courts’
views about their law—are trivially satisfied.
The matter is different, however, if Erie and full faith and
credit include our nondiscrimination principles. A state would
no longer be permitted to designate its substantive choice-of-

216. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 97 (1991) (“If choice of law is assumed to be superlaw,
distinct from the substantive law on which the individual states are free to differ, then there is some sense in saying that the forum will defer to the other
state on matters of substantive law but not on the proper application of choice
of law rules.”); Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of
Laws—Meaning of “The Law of a Country,” 27 YALE L.J. 509, 517–18 (1918)
(arguing that nations do not consider their choice-of-law rules to be binding
upon foreign courts).
217. Kramer, Renvoi, supra note 202, at 1043–44; Roosevelt, supra note
112, at 1861–64.
218. The only time this is done, which itself evokes Swift v. Tyson, is when
the territorial scope of a state’s statute is specified in the statute itself. Roosevelt, supra note 112, at 1858. An example would be a Pennsylvania interspousal immunity statute that limits its application to “Pennsylvania domiciliaries.” Id. A Vermont court would respect such a limitation, even when its
own choice-of-law rules would have come to a different conclusion about the
statute’s territorial scope.
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law rules as binding upon local courts but not upon the courts
of other sovereigns.219
CONCLUSION
The Erie doctrine is commonly viewed as a limit on the
power of federal courts. And that is indeed its primary function.
Under Erie, federal courts must defer to state supreme court
decisions when interpreting a state’s law. The Full Faith and
Credit Clause puts a similar obligation on sister-state courts.
By granting state supreme courts this power over other American courts the Constitution creates a unified legal system.
But this power also carries with it a duty. A state supreme
court may not undermine the legal uniformity demanded by
Erie and the Full Faith and Credit Clause by varying the legal
effect of its decisions on the basis of the jurisdiction of the recognizing court. If its decisions—including its choice-of-law decisions—are binding on domestic courts, they must be binding
throughout the American legal system. Nor can it release other
American courts of the duty to interpret its unsettled law with
fidelity. Since the courts of its own state must interpret its unsettled law with fidelity, so must federal and sister-state
courts. That is the price of the power it enjoys as a participant
in the American legal system. That it must pay this price is the
hidden lesson of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.

219. What choice of law would look like as a result cannot be explored further here. I hope to discuss the matter in a later article.

